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 Space tourism has economic, social, and educational benefits, however, 
unresolved legal issues remain that need to be addressed on state and international levels 
in order for space tourism to succeed and for these benefits to be realized.  Space treaties 
do not address and federal laws have impeded space tourism efforts.  Aviation industry 
regulations, Antarctic treaties, and International Space Station agreements serve as 
models to guide the space tourism.  In the future, however, the space tourism industry 
will create its own legal regime based on the technical expertise of its practitioners and 











The concept of citizens being able to ―tour the heavens‖ sometime not too 
far into the 21
st
  century is one that is exciting to millions and may well 
entice tens of thousands to try. But whether the tourism is in an orbiting 
hotel, a reusable launch vehicle [RLV] or something more modest such as 
a ride in balloon above 100,000 feet, one thing is clear, there will be 
government regulation of these activities.  Why and to what extent 
regulation will be imposed will to a large degree depend on the policy and 
legal framework for such regulation and the degree and specificity of 
guidelines that flow from it.  While marketeers and manufacturers are 
pursuing customers and hardware designs, a concomitant effort to ensure 
that Space Tourism projects do not inadvertently proceed into a regulatory 
box canyon is essential. 
 
       Richard W. Scott, 
       Policy/Legal Framework for  
       Space Tourism Regulation 
       Journal of Space Law, 2000  
 
 The total number of international business and leisure tourists is expected to reach 
1.8 billion by 2030.  In 2012, more than one billion tourists crossed international borders, 
with more than half reaching their destinations by air (United Nations International Civil 
Aviation Organization, 2013).  Air travel, once reserved primarily for the wealthy, and 
considered adventurous and risky, is now routine.  In the future, many of these travelers 
will be space tourists, who have chosen to participate in activities that may combine 
space flight and visits to space hotels or lunar sites, air transportation and travel among 
international destinations, and Antarctic cruises. 
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 Space tourism has been defined as ―any commercial activity offering customers 
direct or indirect experience with space travel‖ and a space tourist as ―someone who tours 
or travels into, to, or through space or to a celestial body for pleasure and/or recreation‖ 
(Masson-Zwaan and Freeland, 2010).  Space tourism will provide opportunities for new 
and existing corporations to offer unique terrestrial experiences, such as flight training, 
virtual reality facilities, and space theme parks (Pitts, 2011), and others that cannot be 
attained on our planet (Goehlich et al., 2013).   
 Only a few hundred humans have traveled into space.  Most were astronauts and 
cosmonauts in government sanctioned space programs.  In 2001, however, Dennis Tito 
became the first paying space tourist, after he reportedly paid $20 million to train in 
Russia for his flight to the International Space Station (ISS) (Spennemann, 2004).  Tito 
was followed by Mark Shuttleworth, Greg Olsen, Anousheh Ansari, Richard Garriott and 
Charles Simonyi, who also traveled to the ISS, via the Russian Space Agency (RSA) 
flights (Cater, 2010). 
 Space tourism operators currently face some of the same risks and regulatory 
uncertainty as early air carriers, as well as additional challenges.  This thesis will review 
the regulatory and legal environment, discuss how it has evolved, and recommend 
changes that would promote the growth of the space tourism industry, which reflect that 
of the aviation industry. 
Why Current International Regulations Won’t Work 
 As space tourism costs decrease, the number of space tourists will increase.  The 
international community will need to prepare for future social, environmental, economic, 
technological, and political situations that will arise as the space tourism industry 
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expands, and space operators and space flight participants develop their own legal codes 
for visiting, living, and working in outer space.   
 Space is no longer a program dominated exclusively by state entities and political 
rivals in a competition to ―get there first‖ in order to demonstrate national superiority. 
While governments have concocted obtuse regulations in an attempt to squelch the 
exchange of technology, private enterprise and ingenious entrepreneurs have found legal 
means to overcome these restrictions.  Many legal issues remain, however, which will 
best be resolved by space entrepreneurs, rather than the United Nations, NASA, or other 
space agencies.  
Aviation, Antarctica, and the ISS  
 International space treaties, created during the Cold War and the evolution of the 
U.S. and Soviet space programs, did not foresee space tourism opportunities; these 
treaties cannot address unique contractual issues that will arise between the space 
operator and space tourist, appropriate space-related tourism activities that merit 
protection and preservation mechanisms, and industry self-regulation in the domains of 
safety, training, and medicine.  Aviation industry regulations, Antarctic treaties and 
tourism policies, and ISS agreements provide the best guide for addressing these issues. 
 Suborbital space tourism has often been compared to air transport, which during 
its early barnstorming days, was undertaken by aviation pioneers, pilots and engineers, 
who understood aerodynamics and risk.  Early aviation was a dangerous activity; space 
tourism, at least in its early days, will also be risky.  This risk will be compounded by 
transporting inexperienced passengers, with days rather than decades of space flight 
training.  Most passengers will undertake suborbital up-and-down flights, a sophisticated 
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and expensive form of bungee-jumping (von der Dunk, 2007-2008), but with many more 
moving parts and explosive propellants.  Over its 100 year history, the aviation industry 
developed rules and regulations that defined the legal relationships and responsibilities of 
air carriers and passengers; some of these can be used as models to establish the legal 
relationships between space tourism operators and space tourists. 
 Antarctica and space are remote environments.  Each has been the subject of a 
series of treaties, sovereignty and jurisdictional issues (Rankin, 2002-2003, Ehrenfreund 
et al., 2012) designed to maintain international peace, collaborative scientific research 
relationships, and protected environments (Bastmeijer and van Hengel, 2009), however, 
Antarctic regulations provide far more guidance to the space tourism industry than space 
treaties.  Evidence indicates that both Antarctica and space harbor mineral resources 
which may be economically exploitable in the foreseeable future.  Lessons learned from 
the legal efforts to protect and sustain Antarctica‘s resources can be applied to the laws 
governing space tourism. 
 During the 1970s, space journeys turned into long duration stays on orbiting space 
stations including Skylab, Mir, and finally, the ISS.  The ISS is an example of space 
cooperation in planning, construction, and implementation, the result of decades of 
intergovernmental scientific, technical and legal agreements, many of which are related 
to crew behavior and responsibility.  The ISS has been the home of international crews 
and space tourists, has expanded our knowledge of human ability to work long-term in 
space, and is currently the best platform from which to advance knowledge of safety, 









II. JURISDICTION, FORUM SELECTION, AND LIABILITY 
 
Several independent sovereign nations may be entitled to exercise 
jurisdiction in a given fact situation.  As might be expected, this legal 
situation has led to a great deal of confusion.  As a result, there have been 
efforts to limit the discretion left to states by international law with respect 
to the exercise of jurisdiction in cases of this sort.  These efforts have been 
made through international conferences and bilateral treaties.  For the most 
part, they have had little effect.  
 
Chester Ward, U.S. Navy Rear Admiral 
11
th
 Annual Meeting of the American Rocket 
Society, 1956 (Doyle, 2002) 
 
 There are no international courts with the power to create general international 
common law, so international law arises through agreements among states.  International 
law can be ―public,‖ defining the relationships among states, or ―private,‖ governing the 
international relationships between international governments and private citizens or 
corporations (Sykes, 2007).  Space law utilizes both, and space tourism operators must 
understand the basic legal concepts of jurisdiction, forum selection, and liability applied 
to their industry. 
Jurisdiction 
 The first 50 years of the space age focused on state and international space 
activities.  Only during the last decade has legislation been enacted which recognizes 
private commercial space activities, including space tourism.  As van Asten (2011) 
stated, one of the challenges to  
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a legal framework in outer space modelled on the legal framework as on 
earth, with scattered jurisdictions based on territoriality and nationality, 
might not be fit for the conditions in outer space.  First of all this might be 
the case because of the magnitude of space, and the problems relating to 
controlling potential territories and nationalities.  Second, should the same 
scattering of territorial jurisdictions as we see on earth occur in outer space 
it will again lead to a serious constraint on jurisdictional efficiency.  In 
short, ―new areas of human activity‖ will create problems. 
 
 Jurisdiction, as applied to space tourism, does not reside in a single body of law.  
Space law encompasses tort law when applied to consent and liability; contract law in 
regard to informed consent, launch arrangements and manufacturing; international law in 
in the application of treaties and bilateral agreements; and, civil procedure and conflict of 
law in regards to jurisdictional issues (Walker, 2007).   Space tourism law, as a product 
of aviation, Antarctic, ISS, and other international laws and treaties, is an interesting 
balance among these jurisdictional frameworks. 
 Space law jurisdiction is imperfect, and in some cases, unenforceable.  If a space 
object lacks a launching state, is launched from a state that is not a signatory to the Outer 
Space Treaty, is launched by a private entity from a private facility located in 
international waters or on Antarctica, or by a state that has not enacted domestic 
legislation to restrict its space operators, there may be no violations of international law 
(Blount, 2007).  States would need to rely on diplomatic, political, or economic pressure 
and innovative solutions to encourage non-cooperative states to exercise jurisdiction over 
their citizens engaged in the space tourism industry. 
Forum Selection 
 Forum selection clauses or jurisdiction agreements are contractual provisions 
stipulating that claims arising from a contract or in relation thereto can be presented 
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before a particular court.  Companies use forum selection clauses to limit the risk and the 
cost of litigation before multiple courts, which may be in different states, and to secure 
litigation in a favorable legal environment, where the law will probably satisfy their legal 
positions in case of a contractual dispute.  Given that the space tourism industry is young 
and uses largely experimental technology, it is expected that operators of suborbital space 
tourism vehicles will use such clauses in their contracts with spaceflight participants 
(Chatzipanagiotis, 2011). 
Liability 
 The two liability doctrines most relevant to the space tourism industry are fault-
based liability or negligence, and strict liability.  Negligence doctrine requires that the 
injured party prove that the defendant in a tort lawsuit is legally responsible for the harm 
because it failed to meet a legally-defined standard of care owed to the victim, and that its 
failure was the main or proximate cause of the injury for which the injured party seeks 
compensation. A space tourism operator may be found liable if it is convincingly shown 
that it behaved inadequately or erroneously when it designed, tested, made or used its 
spacecraft and its associated equipment or failed to adequately train its crew, and that this 
failure was the cause of the claimant‘s injury (Baram, 2007).  
 Strict liability requires proving that a company sold a product or process which 
was unusually or unreasonably dangerous, and that this defective condition was the main 
or proximate cause of the harm, to purchasers, users, bystanders, or rescuers. Strict 
liability eliminates the need to prove that a company behaved inadequately or 
erroneously, and may apply even if the injured party was not the purchaser of the 
8 
product.  As with negligence, persons with compensable injuries may include bystanders 









III. A BRIEF HISTORY OF SPACE LAW 
Never before in the history of mankind has the necessity arisen so quickly 
to state legal parameters in connection with a vast new area of social 
change.  The legal problems presented by the advent of space flight have 
been climacteric and technology has far outstripped the formulation of 
legal rules.  The gap has widened to the point that the peace of the world is 
dependent upon our ability to contain the remarkable and precipitous 
advance of the science and technology of space flight within an effective 
system of laws. 
 
Andrew Haley 
The Law of Space – Scientific and Technical 
Considerations, 1958 
 
 Space law is highly specialized, complex, and unique in its scope and character, 
when compared to other fields of law.   Space law consists of international relations, 
public international law, private international law, international trade law, 
communications law, and intellectual property law.  Space-related goals and abilities of 
states varies significantly; some address both public and private interests, while others 
have been created exclusively by governments with little, if any, input from other 
interests (Jakhu, 2009). 
 Various state regulatory models also complicate space law (Jakhu, 2009).  The 
U.N. Space Law Database lists space laws and bilateral agreements from Argentina, 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, France, Germany, Japan, 
Kazakhstan, Netherlands, Norway, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, South Africa, 
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Spain, Sweden, Ukraine, United Kingdom (U.K.), and the U.S. (United Nations Office 
for Outer Space Affairs, November 1, 2013). 
The Early Years 
 The origins of modern space law began in 1910, with the writings of Belgian 
lawyer, Emile Laude, who referred to it as ―aerial law.‖  In 1919, Paris was the site of the 
International Conference on Aerial Navigation.  At that conference, participants agreed 
that each state had sovereignty over its airspace (Dula, 1985). 
 At an air law conference held in Moscow in December, 1926, V.A. Zarzar, a 
member of the Soviet Aviation Ministry, presented a paper, Public International Air Law, 
on interplanetary flight, which was possibly influenced by the work of Konstantin 
Ziolkovsky.  Zarzar claimed that the use of space by non-Communist countries was 
imperialistic and provided four reasons justifying state control of flights over state 
territory:  prevention of military reconnaissance; protection from contraband falling on 
territory that could damage life or property; prevention of hostile action, such as 
bombing; and protection from unannounced entry into and landings by uninvited aircraft 
(Doyle, 2002). 
 In Arthur C. Clarke‘s 1946 paper, The Challenge of the Spaceship, the author 
noted that, given advances in technology, humans had no choice but to live peacefully, 
and avoid using space for destructive purposes.  In this paper he also warned that the U.S. 
could engage in ―interplanetary imperialism‖ in a quest to be the first to reach the Moon.  
He suggested that the only way to prevent hostile extraterrestrial conflicts were political 
agreements based on the expertise of organizations involved in space-related issues 
(Clarke, 1999).  
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 In 1949, British engineer R. A. Smith sent a letter to the Journal of the British 
Interplanetary Society in which he warned against firing missiles at the Moon, pointing 
out to  
the American government and all other governments, that the Moon is not 
their property, and will not become so by right of bombardment.  It is the 
common heritage of man, possibly, if otherwise untainted, and although 
there is little we can do at the present to prevent the Americans or others 
from abusing their present position of technical advantage, they would be 
stupid to overlook the possibility that militaristic exhibitionism normally 
evokes unpleasant reactions—ultimately (Doyle, 2002).  
 
The phrase ―the common heritage of man‖ would become the subject of debate over the 
following decades (Doyle, 2002).  
 The International Astronautical Federation (IAF), established in 1951, is currently 
the world‘s leading space advocacy organization, with more than 270 members, all key 
space agencies, companies, societies, associations and institutes of 62 countries.  Since its 
inception, the IAF has played a vital role in the development of space law.  It created the 
first international forum for space lawyers to work in conjunction with space experts 
(International Astronautical Federation, 2013).  American lawyer John Cobb Cooper 
(1951), International Institute of Air Law, McGill University, also raised the issue of the 
definition of the upper atmospheric limit of state sovereignty, and the first space flight 
symposium was held at the Hayden Planetarium, exactly six years before the launch of 
Sputnik (Doyle, 2002).  
Pre-Sputnik 
 In January, 1956, C. Wilfred Jenks, of the International Labor Organization of 
Geneva, and Institute of International Law (ILL), published International Law and 
Activities of Space.  Jenks suggested that future space flight would require international 
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cooperation for communication, space flight crew, space rescue regulations, and space 
commerce.  Foreseeing legal issues related to the settlement of the Moon, Jenks also 
stated that 
One can conceive of the United Nations governing extra-mundane 
settlements, directly or by some special agency created for the purpose.  
The ideal arrangement would indeed appear to be that sovereignty over 
unoccupied territory in the moon or other planets or satellites should be 
regarded as vested exclusively in the United Nations (Doyle, 2002). 
 
Jenks also proposed a list of law topics that would need to be applied to space and that 
would require attention from society members:  jurisdictional issues, personal status, 
property rights, contract law, tort law, and criminal law (Doyle, 2002). 
 In April, during the 50
th
 anniversary of the American Society for International 
Law, Cooper presented Legal Problems of Upper Space, remarked that the law had 
lagged behind technological progress, and that scientists have benefited mankind as a 
whole in a field where lawyers might have failed (Cooper, 1956).  He compared air law 
of the 1900s to space law of the 1950s, noted that neither the Paris Convention of 1919 
nor the Warsaw Convention of 1944 dealt with craft beyond the atmosphere, observed 
that there was no basis on which to extend international customary law to high altitudes, 
and concluded that airspace over the seas was ―for free use by all‖ (Doyle, 2002). 
 P.K. Roy, Director of the Legal Bureau of the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO), called into question the definition of airspace, which at that time, 
was considered to extend to an altitude of about 1,500 miles.  Roy believed that  
Airspace does not present itself as a very useful criterion for fixing the 
altitude of state sovereignty any more than the force of gravity helps, 




He also stated that, because of Earth‘s rotation, the actual space over a state was 
constantly changing.  While this is obvious, its implications had not really been explored 
by others in the space law field (Doyle, 2002). 
 International Law Professor Quincy Wright raised questions of international 
liability for damage as the result of space flight activities, specifically those related to 
injury to those not directly involved, and to whom such liability would be attributed if 
states had taken all necessary precautions.  He also warned that states should not enact 
any laws related to space flight which they would be incapable of enforcing (Doyle, 
2002).  While he was referring specifically to satellite missions and human orbital flights, 
this point will also prove relevant when humans explore the Moon and beyond, since 
enforcement at a distance is difficult. 
Sputnik 
 The first and most obvious achievement of the space age was the launch of 
Sputnik 1 on October 4, 1957.  The U.S.S.R prepared an interesting defense in case of 
objections to the overflight of its little satellite:  no violation had occurred, because 
in reality, Sputnik did not pass over other countries, rather, they passed below it as the 
Earth rotated; the outer atmosphere, like the open seas, belongs to no one; and that 
freedom of circulation above 15 or 18 miles should be permitted by international law 
(Quigg, 1958).  After the launch of Sputnik 1, there were no significant protests claiming 
that the satellite had encroached on sovereign territory.  Through their inaction and 
silence, states acknowledged that the legal character of outer space differed from that of 
the air space beneath it, and that states had the right to engage in activities in outer space 
without obtaining prior permission of any other state (Freeland, 2010). 
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 But Sputnik‘s flight  
had a ‗Pearl Harbor‘ effect on American public opinion, creating an 
illusion of a technological gap and provided the impetus for increased 
spending for aerospace endeavors, technical and scientific educational 
programs, and the chartering of new federal agencies to manage air and 
space research and development (Garber and Launius, 2013). 
 
Even after the first satellite launches by the world‘s superpowers, the question of airspace 
versus outer space was still not fully resolved.  In 1958, McDougal and Lipson wrote 
about the interpretations of ―airspace‖ held by legal scholars at the time.  A few 
interpreted its meaning, according to the Chicago Convention, such that sovereignty 
applying to airspace also was extended to outer space.  Their argument was based on 
French and Spanish versions of previous conventions which, when translated into 
English, referenced ―atmospheric space‖ rather than ―airspace.‖  The counterarguments, 
appropriately used by other legal scholars, were that at the time those conventions were 
drafted, no outer space activities existed and there was no need for a definition that 
distinguished ―airspace‖ from ―outer space,‖ and, that vehicles designed to operate in 
airspace were not capable of doing so in outer space (McDougal and Lipson, 1958). 
The Origins of Space Treaties 
 The International Law Association (ILA) was founded in 1873 for  
the study, clarification and development of international law, both public 
and private, and the furtherance of international understanding and respect 
for international law (International Law Association, 2013). 
 
Its Space Law Committee (SLC), established in 1958, works closely with other 
committees to study public and private international law in related to outer space.  It 
cooperates with the International Law Commission (ILC), and the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration to draft dispute settlement procedures for international space law, as well as 
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with the governments of industrialized and developing states.  The ILA SLC participates 
in U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) meetings to promote 
space law education (United Nations General Assembly Committee on the Peaceful Uses 
of Outer Space Legal Subcommittee, 2010). 
 On December 12, 1959, the U.N. General Assembly established COPUOS, per 
Resolution 1472 (XIV), International Co-operation on the Peaceful Uses.  Its purpose is 
to review the scope of international cooperation in peaceful uses of outer space, to create 
related programs to be carried out by the U.N., to encourage continued research and the 
dissemination of information on outer space matters, and to study legal problems arising 
from the exploration of outer space.  It had 24 members when it was established, but 
currently has 74 (United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, March 28, 2013). 
 More than 50 years ago, during the 1960 Second Colloquium on the Law of Outer 
Space, the IAF Permanent Legal Committee became the International Institute of Space 
Law (IISL) (Billings, 2006).  This new organization divided itself into several working 
groups tasked with 
 studying questions related to the definitions of airspace and outer space, state 
jurisdiction in these areas, and the legal status of outer space; 
 determining the legal status of rockets, space vehicles, and other man-made 
instruments designed to return to Earth; 
 dealing with the status of celestial bodies other than Earth and researching 
sovereignty-related issues; 
 identifying laws and treaties requiring change and legal space-related questions 
that had not yet been addressed; 
 researching flight regulations, including vehicle registration, preflight 
inspection, flight traffic rules, notices to airmen, collision avoidance, search and 
rescue, emergency landings, emigration and immigration, disease prevention, 
and information dissemination;  
 enforcing existing regulations through the ICJ and arbitration; 
 planning, allocation and use of the electromagnetic spectrum and the role of the 
International Telecommunication Union; 
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 investigating personal rights in space and the potential legal issues of property 
ownership; 
 determining the issues related to injury and a legal regime for insurance; 
 deciding whether a treaty modeled on the 1959 Antarctic Treaty was suitable as 
basis on which to limit the use of outer space to peaceful purposes; and  
 defining uses for space artifacts, navigation services, spaceship armaments and 
nuclear weapons control (Doyle, 2002).   
 
These issues, raised by IISL members, had considerable influence on the work of 
COPUOS and the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies 
(Outer Space Treaty) (Doyle, 2002).  
 In 1961, the U. N. General Assembly, requested that COPUOS  
 maintain close contact with governmental and non-governmental organizations 
concerned with outer space matters; 
 provide for the exchange of such information relating to outer space activities as 
Governments may supply on a voluntary basis, supplementing, but not 
duplicating, existing technical and scientific exchanges; and 
 assist in the study of measures for the promotion of international cooperation in 









IV. UNITED NATIONS SPACE TREATIES AND LEGAL PRINCIPLES 
 
Explorations in space will necessitate drastic modification in today‘s legal 
principles governing man‘s relations with man.  Science is rapidly 
outdistancing law in the field of space exploration and travel, and legal 
scholars must act forthwith if we are to avoid perpetuating the 
inadequacies of the international law of today in the space law of 
tomorrow. 
  
Andrew G. Haley 
Basic Concepts of Space Law, 1956 
 
 Treaties, conventions, agreements, protocols, and exchanges of notes have the 
same meaning under international law.  Since its creation in 1959, COPUOS has created 
a substantial body of space law in the form of treaties and declarations, but the 
organization is slow, tedious, and deliberate, and has not addressed space tourism issues.  
Treaties have a serious weakness; drafting, adoption, and entry into force can take years, 
decades, or never occur.  Those that rely on scientific evidence, technological innovation, 
or political realities, require negotiators to obtain and assimilate new and uncertain 
information and may prove to be out-of-date and unenforceable because the 
circumstances that prompted their creation no longer exist (Viikari, 2005). 
 U.N. space treaties were created during the Cold War era, when the U.S. and the 
U.S.S.R. were the dominant space powers.  Work on U.N. space resolutions began in 
1957, the year of Sputnik, and over three decades, between 1966 and 1996 the U.N. 
adopted five major space treaties and five major space declarations.  When they were 
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finalized, there was no consideration that humans would engage in widespread 
commercial space tourism activities (Freeland, 2010). 
Outer Space Basic Principles Declaration, 1962 
 One of the first documents submitted to the COPUOS Legal Subcommittee was a 
1962 draft of Declaration of the Basic Principles Governing the Activities of States 
Pertaining to the Exploration and Use of Outer Space (Outer Space Basic Principles 
Declaration), proposed by the U.S.S.R.  This document derived from the controversial 
ideological issue between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. concerning the role of private 
enterprise in outer space.  The Soviet view was that only states were entitled to free use 
and access to outer space in order to prevent chaos caused by private enterprise; the 
American assessment of space argued that private participation should be encouraged and 
that space should be as open as the seas (Chatterjee, 2011). 
 The initial draft was modified and adopted on December 13, 1963, as the first of 
the five U.N. space declarations, by the General Assembly as The Declaration of Legal 
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space.  
It affirmed that ―the exploration and use of outer space shall be carried out for the benefit 
and in the interest of all mankind,‖ that ―outer space and celestial bodies are free for 
exploration and use by all States on a basis of equality and in accordance with 
international law,‖ and that ―celestial bodies were not subject to national appropriation by 
claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means‖ (United 
Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, 1963).  It made states responsible for space 
activities by both governmental and non-governmental entities, and required states to 
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authorize space activities and it established cooperation and mutual assistance as basic 
tenets of space exploration.  Article 8 established liability: 
Each State which launches or procures the launching of an object into 
outer space, and each State from whose territory or facility an object is 
launched, is internationally liable for damage to a foreign State or to its 
natural or juridical persons by such object or its component parts on the 
earth, in air space, or in outer space (United Nations Office for Outer 
Space Affairs, 1963). 
Article 9 described the status of astronauts: 
States shall regard astronauts as envoys of mankind in outer space, and 
shall render to them all possible assistance in the event of accident, 
distress, or emergency landing on the territory of a foreign State or on the 
high seas.  Astronauts who make such a landing shall be safely and 
promptly returned to the State of registry of their space vehicle (United 
Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, 1963). 
Outer Space Treaty, 1966 
 On December 19, 1966, the U.N. General Assembly agreed to the first of the five 
space treaties:  Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration 
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space 
Treaty).  This is one of the most important and most analyzed space legal documents in 
existence.  To date, there are 102 parties and 26 signatories to the treaty (United Nations 
Office for Outer Space Affairs, March 28, 2013).  Articles I and II provided guiding 
principles for nearly all future space treaties and declarations: 
Article I. The exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and 
other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the 
interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or 
scientific development, and shall be the province of all mankind.  
 
Article II.  Outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is 
not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of 
use or occupation, or by any other means (United Nations Office for Outer 
Space Affairs, January 27, 1967).  
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When states were the only entities capable of space flight, Article II would have been 
sufficient, however, space tourism operators will soon be placing space hotels in orbit or 
on the Moon.  Article II addresses only national appropriation, and makes no mention of 
private or individual appropriation of space or celestial bodies.  
 Article VIII states:  
A State Party to the Treaty on whose registry an object launched into outer  
space is carried shall retain jurisdiction and control over such object, and 
over any personnel thereof, while in outer space or on a celestial body. 
Ownership of objects launched into outer space, including objects landed 
or constructed on a celestial body, and of their component parts, is not 
affected by their presence in outer space or on a celestial body or by their 
return to the Earth.  Such objects or component parts found beyond the 
limits of the State Party to the Treaty on whose registry they are carried 
shall be returned to that State Party, which shall, upon request, furnish 
identifying data prior to their return (United Nations Office for Outer 
Space Affairs, January 27, 1967).  
 
Article VIII does not prevent space tourists from interacting with spacecraft, articles left 
in space or on the lunar surface, and seems to encourage their return, rather than leaving 
them where they are located.  It also fails to specify a time period under which the articles 
would need to be returned to their owners (Spennemann, 2004). 
 Article XII states: 
All stations, installations, equipment and space vehicles on the Moon and  
other celestial bodies shall be open to representatives of other States 
Parties to the Treaty on a basis of reciprocity. Such representatives shall 
give reasonable advance notice of a projected visit, in order that 
appropriate consultations may be held and that maximum precautions may 
be taken to assure safety and to avoid interference with normal operations 
in the facility to be visited (United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, 
January 27, 1967).  
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―Advance notice‖ of a visit may be a courteous gesture, but carries little weight if the 
―facility to be visited‖ is non-functional or uninhabited (Spennemann, 2004), leaving it 
open to exploitation by space tourists. 
  For many years the Outer Space Treaty was the only statute governing space 
exploration by non-state entities.  If activities are conducted by non-governmental 
entities, Article VI requires that the appropriate state must authorize and continuously 
supervise such activities, but beyond that, the Outer Space Treaty does not define the 
scope of that supervisory responsibility (Meyer, 2010).  Consequently, the granting state 
becomes legally responsible for the actions of the non-governmental party (Abeyratne, 
1998). 
 This became relevant in 1982, when Space Services, Inc. (SSI) decided to conduct 
the first commercial space launch.  SSI contacted and obtained clearance from several 
U.S. government agencies, including the State Department, North American Aerospace 
Defense Command, the U.S. Navy, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, the 
U.S. Coast Guard, and others.  SSI‘s decision to contact these organizations was based 
only on its own opinions, rather than any accepted definitions of responsible state parties, 
absent in the treaty.  Five months later, SSI‘s Conestoga I was launched into sub-orbit 
over the Gulf of Mexico (Scott, 2000). 
 Article VII established international liability: 
Each State Party to the Treaty that launches or procures the launching of 
an object into outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, 
and each State Party from whose territory or facility an object is launched, 
is internationally liable for damage to another State Party to the Treaty or 
to its natural or juridical persons by such object or its component parts on 
the Earth, in air space or in outer space, including the Moon and other 
celestial bodies (United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, January 
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27, 1967).  
 
As Beckman (1999) observed, this article, and the rest of the treaty, failed to address state 
liability for its own citizens.  This issue would remain unresolved for the next five years. 
 Several articles acknowledged that space activities would require joint, 
international participation, cooperation, and protection of the Earth itself, but provided 
little guidance on how to enforce international cooperation.  Article XIII states:  
The provisions of this Treaty shall apply to the activities of States Parties 
to the Treaty in the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon 
and other celestial bodies, whether such activities are carried on by a 
single State Party to the Treaty or jointly with other States, including cases 
where they are carried on within the framework of international 
intergovernmental organizations (United Nations Office for Outer Space 
Affairs, January 27, 1967).  
 
Article V addresses space personnel: 
States Parties to the Treaty shall regard astronauts as envoys of mankind in  
outer space and shall render to them all possible assistance in the event of 
accident, distress, or emergency landing on the territory of another State 
Party or on the high seas.  When astronauts make such a landing, they 
shall be safely and promptly returned to the State of registry of their space 
vehicle.  In carrying on activities in outer space and on celestial bodies, 
the astronauts of one State Party shall render all possible assistance to the 
astronauts of other States Parties (United Nations Office for Outer Space 
Affairs, January 27, 1967).  
 
But the 1967 definition of ―astronaut‖ was unambiguous and specific; the advent of 
orbital and suborbital space tourism flights will require a broader definition of 
―astronaut.‖ 
 Space tourism operators invest millions of dollars in unique spacecraft 
technology.  If a spacecraft were to land off-course, operators would want the spacecraft, 
its passengers, and its crew returned safely.  Loss of a spacecraft and subsequent 
replacement would be extremely expensive both financially and from a marketing 
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standpoint.  Landing in hostile territory would be far worse, since there is an opportunity 
for technology theft and resale and reverse engineering.  A state that is not a party to the 
Outer Space Treaty or the Rescue Agreement, both of which require the return of 
spacecraft, might also consider impounding the spacecraft and holding its crew and 
passengers as hostages (Freeland, 2005-2006).  Third party liability is also of 
international concern. 
Rescue Agreement, 1967 
 The U.N.‘s second space treaty, the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the 
Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, General 
Assembly Resolution 2345 (XXII) (Rescue Agreement) was proposed on December 19, 
1967.  There are 92 parties and 24 signatories to the treaty.  The Rescue Agreement, 
―prompted by sentiments of humanity‖ (United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, 
December 19, 1967) supersedes the Outer Space Treaty.  
 The changes between the Outer Space Treaty and the Rescue Agreement which 
are the most relevant to space tourism are the use of the terms ―personnel,‖ ―space 
object,‖ and ―spacecraft,‖ and the omission of the phrase ―envoys of all mankind‖ from 
the Rescue Agreement, rather than the use of the terms ―astronaut‖ and ―space vehicle‖ 
as used in the Outer Space Treaty (Zhao, 2009).  Outer Space Treaty language could have 
resulted in a narrow interpretation of what constitutes space-related personnel, potentially 
excluding space tourists on orbital or suborbital commercial space flights, however, the 
lack of any distinction between private and public space flight in the Rescue Agreement 
supports a broad interpretation, requiring states to rescue non-governmental personnel 
24 
and return them, along with private spacecraft, to the state of the launching authority 
(Sundahl, 2009). 
 The broader geographic coverage of the Rescue Agreement eliminates the gap 
that was left by the Outer Space Treaty with respect to landing on celestial bodies or in 
Antarctica and over the seas (Sundahl, 2009).  Article 3 states: 
If information is received or it is discovered that the personnel of a 
spacecraft have alighted on the high seas or in any other place not under 
the jurisdiction of any State, those Contracting Parties which are in a 
position to do so shall, if necessary,…extend assistance in search and 
rescue operations for such personnel to assure their speedy rescue (United 
Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, December 19, 1967).   
 
Article 4 continues: 
If, owing to accident, distress, emergency or unintended landing, the 
personnel of a spacecraft land in territory under the jurisdiction of a 
Contracting Party or have been found on the high seas or in any other 
place not under the jurisdiction of any State, they shall be safely and 
promptly returned to representatives of the launching authority (United 
Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, December 19, 1967).  
 
Sundahl (2009) proposed that the use of the word ―alighted‖ in Article 3, however, makes 
the duty to rescue contingent on the landing of the spacecraft, excluding any duty to 
rescue personnel stranded in orbit or elsewhere in outer space.  Since most space tourists 
will be in orbit, this interpretation would prove problematic for stranded space tourists 
and crews.  There is also no agreement on the term ―personnel.‖  French, Spanish, 
Russian, and Chinese translations of the Rescue Agreement translate ―personnel‖ to 
―crew,‖ but the Italian interpretation includes ―everyone on board‖ (Sundahl, 2009), 
leaving the language open to state interpretation.   
 The primary motivation for most space tourists will be personal enjoyment.  They 
will not qualify as ―envoys of mankind in outer space‖ (United Nations Office for Outer 
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Space Affairs, December 19, 1967).  Complicating the issue even further is the likelihood 
that some space tourists will be engaged in activities, such as photography, educational 
activities, or scientific experiments that could certainly benefit humanity.  In case of an 
accident, it seems unlikely that rescuers will interrogate passengers about the purpose of 
their trip and save only those with press passes, teaching credentials, or university IDs, 
but the smart space tourist should know what the probability of rescue is before 
launching. 
 In 2007, Sheikh Muszaphar Shukor launched with Expedition 16 and landed with 
Expedition 15 after a 10 day stay on the ISS.  Shukor, an orthopedic surgeon, was the first 
Malaysian in space when he was selected as one of two astronauts to be trained at Star 
City in Russia and the first astronaut in Malaysia‘s Angkasawan program (Muslim500, 
2013).  Even though he spent a year training to go into space, NASA refused to classify 
him as either an astronaut or cosmonaut, but rather as a ―spaceflight participant‖ (Failat, 
2012).  If NASA and the RSA do not have clear definitions on what constitutes a 
participant versus an astronaut, rescuers could simply ignore titles with no consequences. 
 Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, however, requires that  
A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the 
light of its object and purpose‖ (United Nations Conference on the Law of 
Treaties, 1969). 
 
The principle and purpose of the Rescue Agreement was ―the humanitarian desire to 
protect the life of those aboard a spacecraft…prompted by sentiments of humanity‖ 
(Sundahl, 2009).  Rescue efforts that fail to attempt to rescue everyone on board, unless 
there are compelling reasons not to do so, lead to absurd, but potentially legal, situations.   
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Liability Convention, 1971 
 On November 29, 1971 the Convention on International Liability for Damage 
Caused by Space Objects, General Assembly Resolution 2777 (XXVI) (Liability 
Convention), was proposed as the third of the U.N. space treaties.  There are 89 parties 
and 22 signatories to this treaty (United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, March 
28, 2013).  Enforcement of this treaty proved to be particularly difficult, as demonstrated 
by more than a year of bureaucratic diplomacy between the governments of Canada and 
the U.S.S.R. 
 Article I(c) of the Liability Convention defines ―launching state‖ as: 
 (i)  A State which launches or procures the launching of a space object;  
 (ii)  A state from whose territory or facility a space object is launched 
(United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, 1971). 
 
and Article 1(d) defines a ―space object‖ as including ―component parts of a space object 
as well as its launch vehicle and parts thereof‖ (United Nations Office for Outer Space 
Affairs, 1971).  This implies that any part of a space object or spacecraft itself is the legal 
responsibility of the launching state, as defined in Article 1(c). 
 On January 24, 1978, a Soviet nuclear powered satellite, Cosmos 954, which 
supposedly contained 100 pounds of uranium 235 deorbited, disintegrating into 
thousands of pieces over and in a large area of Canada (Embassy of Canada, 1979). 
Two weeks later, the Canadian government submitted a request for compensation of 
$6,041,174.70 to the Soviet government.  The negotiations continued for several years, 
and having rejected the original payment request, the U.S.S.R. paid Canada only $3 
million (Beckman, 1999).   
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 Clearly, the Liability Convention failed to provide a timely resolution for a 
situation that involved two state governments.  For the space tourism industry, the 
implications are even more problematic, where flights may involve both non-state and 
state entities, and injuries on the ground and in space.  The convention holds launching 
states absolutely liable for damages, allows only states to make claims, provides no relief 
to space tourists, and prevents private causes of action. Article VII compounds these 
difficulties: 
The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to damage caused by a 
space object of a launching State to:  
(a) Nationals of that launching State;  
(b) Foreign nationals during such time as they are participating in the 
operation of that space object from the time of its launching or at any 
stage thereafter until its descent, or during such time as they are in the 
immediate vicinity of a planned launching or recovery area as the 
result of an invitation by that launching State (United Nations Office 
for Outer Space Affairs, 1971).  
 
Neither space tourists, nor those injured on the ground as a result of a mishap related to 
an orbital or suborbital flight would be protected by the Liability Convention (Zhao, 
2004).  The convention also includes no limit on liability amounts, which has motivated 
the U.S. states to enact laws that hold private space tourism companies responsible for 
damages (Reed, 2009-2010). 
 The Liability Convention addresses damages, but provides no guidance on 
differences between direct and indirect damages, or procedure for determining what 
should be done if damages are discovered long after a launch or landing incident.   As 
Zhao (2004) stated 
No statutory or jurisprudential guidance exists to help decide exact 
recoverable damages in the context of space tort.  Moreover, the 
Convention offers flexible guidance on the standard of compensation: in 
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accordance with international law and the principles of justice and equity 
to restore the damaged party to the condition which would have existed if 
the damage had not occurred.  Such guidance is difficult to follow in 
reality since some basic areas still remain blank: how should one compute 
the quantum of damages in individual cases?  Which national law should 
be applied to determine recoverable damages? 
 
Registration Convention, 1974 
 The November 12, 1974 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into 
Outer Space, General Assembly Resolution 3235 (XXIX) (Registration Convention) is the 
fourth U.N. space treaty.  There are 60 parties and 4 signatories to this treaty (United 
Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, 1974).  Calling upon the previous treaties, Article 
II specifies registration requirements for both single and multiple launching states:  
1.  When a space object is launched into Earth orbit or beyond, the 
launching State shall register the space object by means of an entry in 
an appropriate registry which it shall maintain. Each launching State 
shall inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the 
establishment of such a registry.  
2.  Where there are two or more launching States in respect of any such 
space object, they shall jointly determine which one of them shall 
register the object…(United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, 
1974). 
 
 According to Zhao (2009), the Registration Convention provides a suitable 
framework in which space tourism operators can register vehicles for both orbital and 
suborbital flights, provided that bureaucratic requirements do not hinder the industry.  
The Registration Convention also permits the transfer of satellite ownership while a 
satellite is in orbit, provided that there is an agreement among launching states to transfer 
jurisdiction (Chatterjee, 2011), however, for short duration space tourist flights, this is 
likely not to occur, but on substantially longer flights, the transfer of spacecraft 
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ownership could occur, calling into question the responsibility for the safety and security 
of space tourism crews and participants. 
Moon Agreement, 1979 
If the signatory and ratification status of the Moon Treaty is any guide, 
however, selfish interests of nation states will take precedence over the 
common good of humankind.  Unless we act soon and decisively as a 
world community, we will need to revise Neil Armstrong‘s famous 
statement of 20 July 1969, ―one small step for man, one giant leap for 
mankind‖ to read ―one small step for a selfish individual, one giant loss 
for humankind.‖ 
 
      Dirk Spennemann,  
      The Ethics of Treading on 
      Neil Armstrong’s Footprints, 2004 
 
 Of all of the five U.N. space treaties, the December 5, 1979 Agreement Governing 
the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies General Assembly 
Resolution 34/68 (Moon Agreement) is by far the most controversial.  It took nearly a 
decade to negotiate, an additional five years to achieve the five ratifications necessary to 
enter into force, and it still has not received enough support from space-faring states, 
including the U.S., to have any real impact (Viikari, 2005).  There are currently only 17 
states which are parties to the treaty: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Chile, Kazakhstan, 
Lebanon, Lithuania, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, the 
Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Uruguay (United Nations Office for Outer Space 
Affairs, March 28, 2013).  None is a major space power (Ehrenfreund et al., 2012). 
 The premise of this agreement is that extraterrestrial resources are ―the common 
heritage of mankind.‖  It prohibits exploitation of celestial bodies‘ natural resources, and 
reflects some of the principles found in the Outer Space Treaty.   Together, these two 
treaties seem to promote a legal regime that prevents commercialization of outer space, 
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however, both treaties do permit private ownership, provided that ―internal interests are 
given their due consideration‖ (Meyer, 2010).  But there are two exceptions.  First, 
celestial bodies in the solar system other than Earth and the Moon are no longer subject to 
Moon Agreement restrictions if contrary ―specific legal norms enter into force with 
respect to any of these celestial bodies‖ (United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, 
1979).  Second, if an international regime is created by which   
(a) the orderly and safe development of the natural resources of the Moon;  
(b) the rational management of those resources;  
(c) the expansion of opportunities in the use of those resources;  
(d) an equitable sharing by all States Parties in the benefits derived from those 
resources, whereby the interests and needs of the developing countries, as well 
as the efforts of those countries which have contributed either directly or 
indirectly to the exploration of the Moon, shall be given special consideration 
(United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, 1979),  
 
then exploitation of the natural resources of celestial bodies may proceed (Meyer, 2010).  
Neither public nor private entities, however, can exploit space until a means for 
international resource sharing has been established (Cooper, 2003).   
 While the Moon Agreement admits ―equitable sharing,‖ it does not define 
―equitable,‖ but defers that determination to international consensus.  As Meyer (2010) 
proposed, common sense should dictate that the majority of the profits should go to the 
parties which invested time and funding, and assumed the risk for the development of 
space resources.  The question that arises for space tourism concerns whether or not 
space itself and the Moon are exploitable natural resources since they can be enjoyed by 
space tourists.  If so, then it could be argued that the profits derived from private space 
tourism ventures would need to be shared with the ―international regime,‖ including 
―developing countries‖ which may not have contributed anything to the space tourism 
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industry.  ―International regimes‖ capable of agreeing on wealth distribution derived from 
space tourism activities will suffer even worse diplomatic, bureaucratic, and political 
problems than other treaties and agreements since they will be dealing with actual, rather 
than future, scenarios (Oduntan, 2005).   
 Article 6(2) of the Moon Agreement obligates states: 
In carrying out scientific investigations and in furtherance of the 
provisions of this Agreement, the States Parties shall have the right to 
collect on and remove from the Moon samples of its mineral and other 
substances.  Such samples shall remain at the disposal of those States 
Parties which caused them to be collected and may be used by them for 
scientific purposes (United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, 
1979). 
 
Scientific investigations, or activities claimed to be for scientific purposes which are 
actually primarily tourism-related, have the potential to disrupt the lunar and space 
environment.  Article 7(1) requires that: 
In exploring and using the Moon, States Parties shall take measures to 
prevent the disruption of the existing balance of its environment, whether 
by introducing adverse changes in that environment, by its harmful 
contamination through the introduction of extra-environmental matter or 
otherwise.  States Parties shall also take measures to avoid harmfully 
affecting the environment of the Earth through the introduction of 
extraterrestrial matter or otherwise (United Nations Office for Outer Space 
Affairs, 1979). 
 
Given that there are few signatories to the Moon Agreement, it will be necessary to 
establish clear guiding principles to regulate tourism activities and preserve the lunar 
environment (Freeland, 2005-2006). 
 Article 10 was a noble effort to resolve some of the ambiguity of the Rescue 
Agreement: 
1.  States Parties shall adopt all practicable measures to safeguard the life 
and health of persons on the Moon.  For this purpose they shall regard 
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any person on the Moon as an astronaut within the meaning of article 
V of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies and as part of the personnel of a spacecraft within the 
meaning of the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of 
Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space.  
2.  States Parties shall offer shelter in their stations, installations, vehicles 
and other facilities to persons in distress on the Moon (United Nations 
Office for Outer Space Affairs, 1979). 
 
The lack of support from space-faring states which have the capability of actually 
sending humans to the Moon, however, presently renders this article moot.   
 Article 18 provides for treaty review to encourage states to modify the agreement 
based on changes in technology and other laws: 
Ten years after the entry into force of this Agreement, the question of the  
review of the Agreement shall be included in the provisional agenda of the 
General Assembly of the United Nations in order to consider, in the light 
of past application of the Agreement, whether it requires revision (United 
Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, 1979). 
 
While there was a cursory review by the states parties in 2008, little effort has been put 
into considering agreement modifications (Mukherjee, 2011).   
Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, 2007 
 Principles of improved registration and debris mitigation efforts must work 
together to provide a safe environment for space flight participants and crews.  On 
December 22, 2007, the U.N. COPUOS adopted an updated version of the Space Debris 
Mitigation Guidelines of the United Nations Committee for the Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space.  This document was modified several times over the last decade to address 
increasingly crowded conditions in space, was published in 2010, and called for state 
action to prevent orbital collisions especially in LEO, because of  
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The implementation of space debris mitigation measures is recommended 
since some space debris has the potential to damage spacecraft, leading to 
loss of mission, or loss of life in the case of manned spacecraft. For 
manned flight orbits, space debris mitigation measures are highly relevant 
due to crew safety implications (United Nations Office for Outer Space 
Affairs, 2010). 
 
These guidelines are well intentioned, but voluntary, remaining virtually unenforceable.    
 U.N. COPUOS works primarily on consensus, which worked well in the past, but 
during the last two decades, its decision-making processes have been criticized for 
allowing a small minority to exercise veto power.  COPUOS has failed to draft a space 
treaty since the adoption of the 1979 Moon Agreement.  Instead, COPUOS has proposed 
non-binding resolutions and guidelines (Jakhu and Nyampong, 2010). 
 U.N. deliberations on the concept of ―launching state‖ illustrate the lengthy 
process that must be undertaken to reach international agreements, not on an entire treaty 
or regulation, but simply on terminology that would be used to clarify the interpretation 
of existing or future treaties.  In April, 2004 the COPUOS Legal Subcommittee reached 
an agreement on a draft concept of the ―launching state‖ that began in 2002, and 









V.  FEDERAL AND U.S. SPACE LAWS 
Our approach to foreign policy must reflect the world as it is, not as it used 
to be.  It does not make sense to adapt a 19th century concert of powers, or 
a 20th century balance of power strategy.  We cannot go back to Cold War 
containment, or to unilateralism.  Today we must acknowledge two 
inescapable facts that define our world.  First, no nation can meet the 
world's challenges alone.  The issues are too complex. 
 
Hilary Clinton, Secretary of State,  
Council on Foreign Relations Address, 
July 15, 2009 
 
United States Regulations   
 Over the last 50 years the U.S. has enacted legislation that will directly or 
indirectly affect the space tourism industry.  Several laws enacted during the last decade 
have tended to support space tourism, however, the current U.S. Congress does not act 
quickly, and is easily distracted by the personal agendas of its more vocal and self-
righteous members, as was demonstrated during the October, 2013 government 
shutdown.  If and when spaceport operations require federally funded employees, 
government shutdowns that occur while tourists are in space or on the lunar surface, 
would be particularly problematic.  U.S. legislation that prevents Congressional pay 




Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 1976 
 The 1976 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) deals with law suits by U.S. 
citizens against foreign governments brought in U.S. federal courts.  A foreign state is 
immune from the U.S. jurisdiction, and unless a specified exception applies, the court 
lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claim.  This means that a U.S. citizen is barred 
from suing a foreign government in a U.S. court for injuries suffered from the foreign 
government's activities, in outer space for example, unless an exception to the FSIA can 
be satisfied.  There are seven possible exceptions, four of which are conceivably 
applicable to tort based injuries related to space travel:  
(1) any case in which the foreign state has either expressly or impliedly 
waived its sovereign immunity; 
(2) in any case in which the action is based upon a commercial activity 
outside of the U.S. where the act causes a ―direct effect‖ in the U.S.; 
(3) in a case in which money damages are sought for personal injury or 
death, or damage to or loss of property, occurring within the U.S. and 
caused by the tortious act or omission of a foreign state or employee; 
(4) in any case in which a foreign state has brought an action in a court 
within the U.S., or in a case in which a foreign state intervenes  
(Beckman, 1999). 
 
This means that even though a state may have signed a treaty, it has not waived its rights 
under FSIA, including those related to space activities.  The Supreme Court has ruled that 
FSIA would allow for damage recovery as a result of negligent foreign acts within the 
territorial air space of the U.S., but not beyond it, even if the alleged tort had ―effects‖ 
within the U.S.  The ―commercial activity‖ exception allows a suit against a foreign state 
when the cause of action of the suit is based upon a state‘s ―commercial activity‖ within 
the U.S. by the foreign state, or upon an act outside the territory of the U.S. in connection 
with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that causes a direct effect 
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within the U.S. (Beckman, 1999).  One exception to foreign sovereign immunity occurs 
when the foreign government is involved in a commercial enterprise in the U.S. (Rankin, 
2002-2003). 
 Adding to the confusion, and relevant to space tourism, is the situation where a 
corporation is indirectly owned by one or more foreign states or is in part controlled by 
one or more foreign government officials who may or may not be acting in an official 
governmental capacity (Vollmer and Bederman, 2001).  Space tourists, unaware that the 
craft on which they are about to take their suborbital journey is owned by a foreign state, 
will likely have no knowledge of the potential impacts of FSIA on their ability to sue in 
the case of an accident (Rankin, 2002-2003). 
Arms Export Control Act and ITAR, 1976 
 In 1976 Congress also passed the Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. 2778, an 
exercise in frustration and overreaction, creating a dazzling maze of legal confusion: 
In carrying out functions under this section with respect to the export of 
defense articles and defense services, including defense articles and 
defense services exported or imported pursuant to a treaty referred to in 
subsection (j)(1)(C)(i), the President is authorized to exercise the same 
powers concerning violations and enforcement which are conferred upon 
departments, agencies and officials by subsections (c), (d), (e), and (g) of 
section 11 of the Export Administration Act of 1979 [50 App. 50 U.S.C. 
2410(c), (d), (e), and (g)], and by subsections (a) and (c) of section 12 of 
such Act [50 App. U.S.C. 2411 (a) and (c)], subject to the same terms and 
conditions as are applicable to such powers under such Act [50 App. 
U.S.C. 2401 et seq.], except that section 11(c)(2)(B) of such Act shall not 
apply, and instead, as prescribed in regulations issued under this section… 
(Legal Information Institute, November 10, 2013). 
 
Subchapter III continues: 
   
(2) Decisions on issuing export licenses under this section shall take into account 
whether the export of an article would contribute to an arms race, aid in the 
development of weapons of mass destruction, support international terrorism, 
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increase the possibility of outbreak or escalation of conflict, or prejudice the 
development of bilateral or multilateral arms control or nonproliferation 
agreements or other arrangements (Legal Information Institute, November 10, 
2013). 
 
 The U.S. Government requires all manufacturers, exporters, and brokers of 
defense articles, defense services or related technical data to be International Traffic in 
Arms Regulations (ITAR) compliant, however, the ITAR lacks a definition of what it 
actually means for a corporation to be ―ITAR certified‖ (International Import-Export 
Institute, 2013).  The ITAR covers space systems and associated equipment such as 
ground stations, electronics, optical components, and technical data (Choi and Niculescu, 
2006), which means that it likely will affect space tourism operators, who will depend on 
using several of these systems to facilitate space tourism safety.   
 The ITAR has expensive consequences for the space tourism industry.  In Russia, 
for more than a year, two security guards and two American federal government monitors 
watched a piece of equipment, ―a glorified metal table designed to keep Bigelow 
Aerospace's Genesis I space habitat from getting dirty on the floor‖ (Koebler, 2013).  
Under the ITAR, the table was included on the United States Munitions List (USML), 
meaning that it could have potentially served military purposes.  According to federal 
definitions, it was highly dangerous if it fell into the wrong hands.  Mike Gold, Director 
of Bigelow Aerospace‘s Washington, D.C. operations, described the purpose of the 
program in which this ―dangerous‖ metal table was being used: 
Kosmotras takes Russian SS-18s and turns them into commercial space 
launchers (called the Dnepr). It is literally a ‗swords-into-plowshares‘ 
program. Transforming a weapon of war into a tool for peaceful 
commerce, and working with former Cold War opponents is what space 
exploration is all about, and is part of what made the Genesis campaigns 
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so special.  We weren‘t just building better technology, but building a 
better, more peaceful future (University of Mississippi Law School, 2008). 
 
 The ITAR restrictions have had unintended, but not necessarily unforeseen 
consequences.  Not only had the ITAR not deterred the Chinese space program, it 
provided the Chinese with new opportunities and challenges.  At the Third Annual Space 
Exploration Conference in Denver, Jin (2008) reported that there was an obvious lack of 
trust between the U.S. and China manifested through the application of the ITAR.  He 
noted the ―Positive effects of close door policy: government investment, a great pool of 
young scientists and engineers, and working harder‖ and ―Great potential, optimistic with 
patience: earth science, climate research, data sharing on various scientific missions, and 
robotic exploration of several kinds‖ as part of the Chinese space program. 
 The ITAR also prohibits non-U.S. citizens from viewing the inside of a spacecraft 
with technology or equipment developed in the U.S.  Space flight operators are required 
to train space flight participants to respond to emergency situations.  Doing so is 
impossible without allowing operators to familiarize space tourists with spacecraft safety 
features, exposing spacecraft components, and possibly technical data through visual 
inspection, hands on training, and responses to questions asked by space tourists during 
safety training.  If a foreign space flight participant was denied requested information 
deemed protected under the ITAR, it could be argued that the lack of information 
prevented informed consent, leading to lawsuits against the space tourism operator.  The 
operator would then be liable for not securing required export licenses to fulfill its duty of 
informed consent.  If the operator discloses information to a foreign space flight 
participant without a proper export license, then the operator could be held liable for 
39 
violating the ITAR restrictions (Blount, 2010).  Even if the foreign tourist receives 
compulsory safety training and is allowed to board the spacecraft, the ITAR requires that 
monitors be present during any meetings that might involve technology transfer, implying 
that the monitor would also need to be present during the flight itself, increasing operator 
expenses and reducing income, as the result of having to use a seat that cannot be sold to 
a space tourist (Blount, 2010). 
 Based on the ITAR, Blue Origin, the Personal Spaceflight Federation, and the 
New Mexico Office for Space Commercialization noted that the ITAR requirements 
would prevent space tourism operators from providing flight experiences to foreign 
participants.  Blue Origin suggested that the FAA establish the same disclosure standards 
for U.S. citizens and foreign nationals, to only ―general systems descriptions‖ which 
would then conform with ―Technical Data‖ as defined in the ITAR 22 CFR  120.10(a)(5). 
The FAA finally agreed (Blount, 2010). 
 In 2007, Bigelow Aerospace filed the first legal challenge to the ITAR rules, 
disputing claims that foreign space tourists were involved in a transfer of technology.  In 
2009, Mike Gold, Bigelow‘s attorney, indicated that the government‘s decision was 
―everything we could want,‖ but the ruling rejects passengers from Sudan, Iran, North 
Korea and China, who will not be allowed to fly or train on suborbital passenger flights, 
or visit Bigelow's space station (The Economist, 2009). 
 Marc Holzapfel, legal counsel for Virgin Galactic, described the ruling as a 
―major development,‖ freeing the space tourism industry from the ―complicated, 
expensive and dilatory export-approval process‖ (The Economist, 2009).  Tim Hughes, 
chief counsel of SpaceX, agreed, stating that the approval represented a ―common-sense 
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approach‖ and bodes well for similar requests made by companies such as his own to 
carry foreign astronauts hoping to work on missions to the ISS (The Economist, 2009). 
 Finally, in August, 2009, with the support of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, 
Defense Secretary Robert Gates, National Security Advisor General James Jones, and 
Ellen Tauscher Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, the 
White House announced an official ITAR review.  During the first eight months of the 
Obama administration, the average license application process time was cut from 43 days 
to two weeks (Klamper, 2009).  This announcement occurred 33 years after ITAR‘s 
inception.  Decade-long legal deliberations are clearly not acceptable in promotion of the 
space tourism industry. 
Commercial Space Law Amendments Act, 2004 
 The Commercial Space Law Amendments Act, Public Law 108–492 (CSLAA), 
was passed by Congress on December 23, 2004.  It was the first legislation to specifically 
define human space flight as a commercial activity; to streamline the regulatory process 
and remove launch barriers; to balance safety and innovation; and to lessen liability 
requirements for space flight operators (Bromberg, 2005).  The act included several new 
amendments specifically addressing space tourism: 
(10) the goal of safely opening space to the American people and their 
private commercial, scientific, and cultural enterprises should guide 
Federal space investments, policies, and regulations; 
(11) private industry has begun to develop commercial launch vehicles 
capable of carrying human beings into space and greater private 
investment in these efforts will stimulate the Nation‘s commercial 
space transportation industry as a whole; 
(12) space transportation is inherently risky, and the future of the 
commercial human space flight industry will depend on its ability to 
continually improve its safety performance; 
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(13) a critical area of responsibility for the Department of Transportation 
is to regulate the operations and safety of the emerging commercial 
human space flight industry; 
(14) the public interest is served by creating a clear legal, regulatory, and 
safety regime for commercial human space flight; and 
(15) the regulatory standards governing human space flight must evolve as 
the industry matures so that regulations neither stifle technology 
development nor expose crew or space flight participants to avoidable 
risks as the public comes to expect greater safety for crew and space 
flight participants from the industry (United States Congress, 2004). 
 
It also defined the differences between ―crew,‖ 
any employee of a licensee or transferee, or of a contractor or 
subcontractor of a licensee or transferee, who performs activities in the 
course of that employment directly relating to the launch, reentry, or other 
operation of or in a launch vehicle or reentry vehicle that carries human 
beings (United States Congress, 2004) 
 
and ―space flight participant,‖ ―an individual, who is not crew, carried within a launch 
vehicle or reentry vehicle‖ (United States Congress, 2004).   Crews are required to meet 
safety training standards, and license holders must notify their crews and space tourists, 
in writing, that the U.S. has not certified the launch vehicle.  In return space flight 
participants must sign informed consent agreements (United States Congress, 2004). 
 The 2004 CSLAA requires entities that launch space vehicles to purchase $500 
million in third-party liability insurance, but does not mandate that space tourism 
operators insure space flight participants, who would need to purchase their own 
insurance (van Oijhuizen Galhego Rosa, 2012).  The huge cost of insurance for space 
tourism, if purchased by commercial operators, would be passed on to space tourists and 
result in high ticket prices that would exceed what most potential tourists would be 
willing to pay (Zhao, 2009). 
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 To facilitate private space travel, new amendments directed the Secretary of 
Transportation to require only one permit ―to conduct activities involving crew or space 
flight participants, including launch and reentry‖ (United States Congress, 2004) and 
allow for the issuance of experimental permits, based on historical experimental aircraft 
programs (Bromberg, 2005).  The act also required the Secretary of Transportation to 
undertake a study to assess the liability risk sharing regime in the U.S. and in other states 
involved in commercial space transportation and includes additional language related to 
reciprocal waivers to reduce tort liability risks and insurance premiums for launch 
operators.  
FAA and Commercial Space Activities, 2005 
 In April, 2005, SpaceShipOne designer Burt Rutan testified before House 
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics about FAA oversight: 
It resulted in cost-overruns.  It increased the risk for my test pilots. It did 
not reduce the risk to the non-involved public. It destroyed our safety 
policy of always question the product, never defend it…The regulatory 
process imposed by AST was grossly misapplied for our research tests.  
And worse yet, is likely to be misapplied for the regulation of future 
commercial spaceliners (David, 2005). 
 
FAA Associate Administrator Patricia Grace Smith, responded to Rutan's testimony, 
stating that the agency  
is extremely proud of our safety record and we intend to maintain this 
level of public safety as we work with developers of suborbital reusable 
launch vehicles.  The space tourism sector represents a promising new 
market that will generate economic benefits for our nation but only if it is 
considered a sage and reliable form of transportation.  We are striving to 
support and promote the development of this new industry by offering a 




The FAA‘s implication is that it is in a better position to evaluate the safety of space 
tourism vehicles than the designer, and that giving Rutan, or others in the field, discretion 
to determine the safety of their vehicles would give them too much oversight.  That logic, 
however, makes no sense.  It is in the best interest of the space tourism industry to 
undertake whatever means are necessary to design, build, test, and fly the safest vehicles 
possible to ensure the success of the new industry.  The space tourism market will expand 
only if passengers have confidence in the safety of the vehicles.  Vehicle designers, rather 
than the FAA or any other governmental agency, are in a better position to make that 
determination (Walker, 2007). 
Draft Guidelines for Crewed Commercial Suborbital RLV Operations, 2005 
 On February 11, 2005, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued the 
Draft Guidelines for Commercial Suborbital Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV) Operations 
with Flight Crew (Crewed RLV Flight Guidelines Draft).  The guidelines require 
appropriate medical training, flight certification, and nominal and emergency scenario 
flight training for RLV flight crews.  Guidelines also reiterate the CSLAA requirements 
for notifying RLV flight crews that the U.S. has not certified the launch and require that 
RLV crew members file reciprocal waiver of claims with the DOT/FAA (Federal 
Aviation Administration, February 11, 2005a). 
Draft Guidelines for Passengered Commercial Suborbital RLV Operations, 2005 
 On the same date that it issued the Crewed RLV Flight Guidelines, the FAA 
issued the Draft Guidelines for Commercial Suborbital Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV) 
Operations with Space Flight Participants (Passenger RLV Flight Guidelines Draft).  
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The major differences between these two documents are the risk disclosures, that must 
notify the space tourist, in plain language, of the hazards of space flight, and  
describe to each space flight participant the safety record of all launch or 
reentry vehicles that have carried one or more persons on board, including 
both U.S. government and private sector vehicles.  The safety record 
should not be limited to only the vehicles of a particular RLV operator 
(Federal Aviation Administration, February 11, 2005b). 
 
Space tourism operators must also train passengers on what to do in emergencies, answer 
participants‘ questions, and institute safety protocols to prevent tourists from interfering 
with crew responsibilities or jeopardizing the safety of the crew and other passengers.  
Guidelines include the same notifications as those to RLV crews, that the U.S. has not 
certified the launch.  Space flight passengers must also file reciprocal waiver of claims 
with the DOT/FAA (Federal Aviation Administration, February 11, 2005b). 
FAA Requirements for Crew and Space Flight Participants, 2006 
 The 1976 ITAR had negative consequences for the U.S. commercial space flight 
industry, and its ramifications for the space tourism industry could have had equally 
adverse effects.  The 2006 Federal Aviation Administration Human Spaceflight 
Requirements for Crew and Spaceflight Participants (Human Spaceflight Requirements) 
rectified some of the potential negative effects, and at the same time, addressed the 
Passenger RLV Flight Guidelines, which specified that space flight operators were 
mandated to respond to space tourists‘ questions related to flight safety and system 
operations, at least at a system level (Federal Aviation Administration, 2006). 
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Protecting and Preserving Lunar Artifacts, 2011 
 On July 20, 2011 NASA issued Recommendations to Space-Faring Entities: How 
to Protect and Preserve the Historic and Scientific Value of U.S. Government Lunar 
Artifacts (Lunar Artifacts Preservation).  In this document  
NASA recognizes the steadily increasing technical capabilities of space-
faring commercial entities and nations throughout the world and further 
recognizes that many are on the verge of landing spacecraft on the surface 
of the moon… NASA has assembled this document that contains the 
collected technical knowledge of its personnel – with advice from external 
experts and potential space-faring entities – and provides interim 
recommendations for lunar vehicle design and mission planning teams 
(National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2011). 
 
NASA asserts U.S. Government ownership of  
A.  Apollo lunar surface landing and roving hardware;  
B.  Unmanned lunar surface landing sites (e.g., Surveyor sites);  
C.  Impact sites (e.g., Ranger, S-IVB, LCROSS, lunar module [LM] 
ascent stage);  
D.  USG experiments left on the lunar surface, tools, equipment, 
miscellaneous EVA hardware; and  
E.  Specific indicators of U.S. human, human-robotic lunar presence, 
including footprints, rover tracks, etc., although not all anthropogenic 
indicators are protected as identified in the recommendations (National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2011) 
 
based on the National Aeronautics and Administration Act, the 2010 NASA 
Authorization Act, the United States Constitution, and the Outer Space Treaty:  
parties to the treaty retain jurisdiction and control over objects launched 
into outer space that are listed on their registries, while they are in outer 
space and that ownership of objects launched into outer space is not 
affected by their presence in outer space or by their return to Earth (United 
Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, 2011). 
 
The document includes detailed technical and specific geological recommendations for 
descent and landing, use of natural boundaries, and collision and contamination 
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avoidance for commercial space operators.  It makes special mention of the Apollo 11 
and 17 sites: 
Apollo 11 was a pivotal event in human exploration and technology 
history. Apollo 11 marked the first human flight to the lunar surface; 
Apollo 17 represented the last within the Apollo Program. Project Apollo 
in general, and the flight of Apollo 11 in particular, should be viewed as a 
watershed in human history and humanity…The site of that first landing 
requires preservation; only one misstep could forever damage this 
priceless human treasure (National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 
2011). 
 
 In a departure from the previous, exclusively U.S.-centered approach, Appendix C 
listed specific items, including Soviet Lunas 9 and 13, and Lunokhod  I and II, delivered 
by Lunas 17 and 21 respectively.  Lunokhod 1 traveled more than 10 kilometers, 
surviving 11 lunar day-night cycles.  Lunokhod 2 traveled 37 kilometers, surviving four 
months.  While one of the Lunokhod rovers remains Russian property, the other has been 
sold to a private individual.  NASA, however, has no authority over Russian property 
(National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2011). 
U.S National Space Transportation Policy, 2013 
 In November, 2013, the Office of the President of the United States released the 
National Space Transportation Policy.  Among its goals are: enabling the capabilities to 
support human space transportation activities to and beyond LEO, including services to 
and from the ISS; developing a deep-space-capable transportation system; facilitating 
U.S. commercial industry access to available public data and lessons learned related to 
human spaceflight; and pursuing policy, regulatory, and other measures to foster the 
development of U.S. commercial spaceflight capabilities serving the emerging 
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nongovernmental human spaceflight market (Office of the President of the United States, 
2013). 
 The policy affirms a commitment to the commercial space flight industry by 
directing the Secretary of Transportation to ensure that the regulatory environment for 
licensing commercial space transportation activities is timely and responsive.  It also 
addresses current market and industry developments; supports continuation of the current 
liability risk-sharing regime for U.S. commercial space transportation activities, including 
provisions for the conditional payment of excess third-party claims by the U.S. 
government; and advocates for the international adoption of U.S. safety regulations,  
standards, and licensing measures to enhance global interoperability and safety of 
international commercial space transportation activities (Office of the President of the 
United States, 2013).  While the policy is a step in the right direction, it fails to consider 
the technical expertise of members of the space tourism industry and their role in the 
development of space-related regulations.  Like government policies of the past, it places 
the U.S. government in control and at the center of commercial space.  
Space Launch Liability Indemnification Extension Act, 2013 
 On December 2, 2013, Congress approved the Space Launch Liability 
Indemnification Extension Act, HR 3547 by a vote of 376 to 5.  The bipartisan bill 
extends, for one year, commercial space transportation risk-sharing and liability regime 
established by the CSLAA.  The bill extends CSLAA provisions which cover third-party 
liability for licensed commercial space launches. The bipartisan bill was introduced by 
Texas Republican and Committee Chair Lamar Smith, Ranking Member and Texas 
Democrat Eddie Bernice Johnson, Space Subcommittee Chairman and Mississippi 
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Republican Steven Palazzo, and Space Subcommittee Ranking Member and Maryland 
Democrat Donna Edwards (Spaceref.com, 2013).  This is only one example of the 
legislation that will need to be enacted to enable private space tourism operators to serve 
the international community. 
U.S. State Space-Related Legislation 
 The U.N. and state governments have been unable to create laws that can address 
the unique nature of space tourism.  The 10
th
 Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states: 
―The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it 
to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people‖ (Legal Information 
Institute, November 17, 2013).  Consequently, six states, all of which have played major 
roles in U.S. space efforts, have enacted space flight regulations aimed at addressing 
liability and informed consent via a waiver, to encourage space entrepreneurs to engage 
in space-related enterprises in their states.   
Virginia Space Liability and Immunity Act, 2007 
 In 2007, Virginia became the first U.S. state to pass legislation aimed at 
facilitating the growth of the space tourism industry with the Space  
Liability and Immunity Act (Federal Aviation Administration, 2009).  Virginia‘s law 
states: 
…a spaceflight entity is not liable for a participant injury resulting from 
the risks of spaceflight activities, provided that the participant has been 
informed of the risks of spaceflight activities as required by federal law 
pursuant to federal law and this article, and the participant has given his 
informed consent that he is voluntarily participating in spaceflight 
activities after having been informed of the risks of those activities as 




New Mexico Space Flight Informed Consent Act, 2010 
 New Mexico‘s space tourism efforts began in the early 1990s, with the Southwest 
Space Task Force (SSTF).  In June, 1994, the New Mexico State Legislature established 
the Office for Space Commercialization.  In 2003, SSTF members convinced Economic 
Development Cabinet Secretary Rick Homans, that New Mexico was an ideal location 
for a spaceport.  Former Governor Bill Richardson and the New Mexico State Legislature 
agreed to support financing the new spaceport starting in 2005 (Spaceport America, 
2013).   
 On March 1, 2010, the New Mexico State Legislature passed the Spaceflight 
Informed Consent Act (Legislature of the State of New Mexico, 2010), with language 
similar to that of Virginia‘s.  Section 4 provides a warning, which if not signed by the 
participant, prevents the space tourism operator from invoking liability immunity: 
I understand and acknowledge that under New Mexico law, there is no 
liability for injury or death sustained by a participant in a space flight 
activity provided by a space flight entity if the injury or death results from 
the inherent risks of the space flight activity.  Injuries caused by the 
inherent risks of the space flight activities may include, among others, 
death, bodily injury, emotional injury or property damage.  I assume all 
risks for participating in this space flight activity (Legislature of the State 
of New Mexico, 2010).     
  
On April 12, 2013, New Mexico Governor Susana Martinez signed an updated version of 
the 2010 bill that  
provides coverage to both operators and their supply chain during the 
critical early years of the industry‘s development. The enhancement, 
which costs taxpayers nothing, still allows legal options for spaceflight 
participants in cases of willful, wanton or reckless disregard, while 
creating an environment that enables New Mexico to more successfully 
recruit and retain commercial space tenants and customers for human 
spaceflight operations at Spaceport America (Messier, 2013). 
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New Mexico has already reaped significant financial benefits from the space tourism 
industry: 
Spaceport America has already created over 1,100 construction jobs in 
New Mexico and the continuing economic impact is already delivering on 
its promise to the people of New Mexico…Spaceport America is now 
generating consistent revenues for the State of New Mexico following the 
commencement of rent on the 20-year lease of the spaceport‘s main 
terminal hangar facility, signed with Virgin Galactic in 2008. The NMSA 
continues to work closely with leading aerospace firms such as Virgin 
Galactic, Lockheed Martin, Moog-FTS, and UP Aerospace and their 
customers NASA and the Department of Defense to develop commercial 
spaceflight at the new facility (Messier, 2013). 
 
Other U.S. State Space Laws 
 Passed in 2011, the Florida Spaceflight Informed Consent Act, Title XXV, Chapter 
331, Facilities and Commerce, is nearly identical to the Virginia and New Mexico 
legislation (Florida Senate, 2011).  On March 15, 2011 the Texas Senate passed S.B. 115, 
the Texas Space Liability Act (Blount, 2011), with language nearly identical to that of the 
other states.  Texas offers the broadest protection, and limits liability under all mission 
phases, including preparation of the launch vehicle, the launch, the time between launch 
and re-entry, preparation for re-entry and actual re-entry, landing, and post-landing 
recovery (Yates, 2012). 
 On April 19, 2012, Colorado enacted Concerning Limited Liability for Spaceflight 
Activities (Colorado State Senate, 2012).  Colorado followed the lead of the other states, 
but added an additional exception to limited liability: when the spaceflight operator had 
actual knowledge of, or reasonably should have known of, a dangerous condition on the 
land or in the facilities or equipment used (Yates, 2012). 
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 The 2012 California Space Flight Liability and Immunity Act, A. B. 2243 
(California Legislative Information, 2012) is also similar to the other state laws.  The 
passage was praised by CSF President Michael Lopez-Alegria: 
With the space shuttle Endeavour‘s arrival in California closing the door 
on one era, this bill is opening the door to another. Commercial companies 
will soon begin to open up access to space for the public and preserve 
America‘s leadership in spaceflight.  This bill will provide the required 
liability protections needed for the companies in this developing sector to 
operate in an efficient and effective manner, while acknowledging that 










VI. INTERNATIONAL SPACE-RELATED AGREEMENTS 
 
 There are no international courts with the power to create general international 
common law, so international law arises through agreements among states.  International 
law can be ―public,‖ defining the relationships among states, or ―private,‖ governing the 
international relationships between international governments and private citizens or 
corporations (Sykes, 2007).  Space law often entails the application of both. 
Manned Space Flight Draft Convention, 1991 
 In 1988, the Institute of Air and Space Law of Cologne University in Germany, 
represented by Professor Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel, the Institute of State and Law of the 
Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., represented by Professor Vadlen Vereshchetin, and 
the Research and Study of Space Law and Policy Center of the University of Mississippi 
Law School (USA) represented by Professor Stephen Gorove, initiated a research project 
to create the Draft for a Convention on Manned Space Flight.  Recalling the aims of the 
Outer Space Treaty, the Rescue Agreement, the Liability Convention, and the 
Registration Convention, Article IV of this proposal, Rights and Obligations of Persons 
on Manned Space Flight, specified the responsibilities of the commander and crew to a 
level of detail that had not been done in any previous space-related treaties, declarations, 
or laws, and which can and should be utilized in future space tourism-related regulations: 
1.  The preparation of the manned space flight, determination of 
composition and functions of the crew and participation of other 
persons as well as their rights and obligations fall within the 
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competence of the State exercising jurisdiction and control.  The same 
applies to an international manned space flight, unless the States 
participating in the flight agree otherwise. 
2.  The commander of the manned space object shall (1) provide for the 
safety and wellbeing of all persons on board, and (2) provide for the 
protection of the space flight elements and any payload carried or 
serviced by the manned space object.  The commander shall have sole 
authority throughout the flight to use any reasonable and necessary 
means to achieve this end. 
3.  The authority of the commander extends to all persons participating in 
the space flight, irrespective of their nationality.  It also extends to all 
manned space flight elements and payloads (Böckstiegel et al., 1991). 
 
 The writers of the draft had anticipated that it would serve as the basis for 
international discussions, and they planned to publish the draft in state and international 
journals.  At its session in Dresden in October 1990, the Board of Directors of the IISL 
communicated the draft to the COPUOS Legal Sub-Committee.  Despite these efforts, 
and the draft‘s attention to registration, jurisdiction and control, safety, mutual assistance, 
liability, intellectual property, and dispute resolution, the draft was never adopted 
(Böckstiegel et al., 1991). 
United States and Russian Federation Agreement, 1992 
 The June 17, 1992 Russian Federation Agreement between the United States of 
America and the Russian Federation Concerning Cooperation in the Exploration and 
Use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes (Russian Federation Agreement) established 
that the two governments  
Expressing their satisfaction with cooperative accomplishments in the 
fields of astronomy and astrophysics, earth sciences, space biology and 
medicine, solar system exploration and solar terrestrial physics, as well as 
their desire to continue and enhance cooperation in these and other fields 
(Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency, 1992) 
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would cooperate to increase the ―potential for commercial applications of space 
technologies for the general benefit‖ (Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency, 1992).  
Article I of the agreement allowed for ―the possibility of working together in other 
areas,‖ and Article II provided that ―The Parties may designate additional implementing 
agencies as they deem necessary to facilitate the conduct of specific cooperative activities 
in the fields enumerated in Article 1 of this Agreement‖ (Japan Aerospace Exploration 
Agency, 1992). 
 While this agreement did not foresee cooperation between the two states in the 
space tourism industry it did not preclude such an arrangement, and may serve as a basis 
for future agreements where the two states have political, economic, environmental, or 
technical needs to cooperate as partners with commercial or international entities in the 
space tourism industry. 
Russian Space Activity Law, 1993 
 On August 20, 1993, the Russian House of Soviets enacted the Law of the Russian 
Federation “About Space Activity,” Decree No. 5663-1 (Russian Space Activity Law) 
(United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, 1993).  Both civilian and military space 
activities are regulated by this law, which was amended in November 1996.  The law 
consists of seven sections which consider general issues related to space, organization of 
space activities in the Russian Federation, economics, space infrastructure, space safety, 
international cooperation, and liability (United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, 
1993). 
 The Russian Space Activity Law mentions principles of international law as a 
binding source of law governing space activities of and in the Russian Federation.  
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Article 23 includes specific space accident investigation procedures; Article 24 defines 
search-and-rescue authority; and Article 25 mandates insurance for space activities.  
Article 30 addresses liability:   
1.  Liability for damages inflicted by space objects of the Russian 
Federation within the territory of the Russian Federation or outside the 
jurisdiction of any state except outer space shall arise regardless of the 
fault of the inflictor thereof. 
2.  If in any place, except from the Earth‘s surface, damage has been 
inflicted on a space object of the Russian Federation or on property 
onboard such an object by another space object, the liability of the 
organization and citizen owners of another space object shall emerge 
with their being at fault and in proportion to their fault. 
3.  Damage inflicted to a person or property of a citizen, as well as 
damage inflicted on a property of an organization by a space object of 
the Russian Federation while performing space activity on a territory 
of the Russian Federation or outside its territory, shall be compensated 
by the organization or citizen that insured their liability for damage in 
a size and order foreseen by the Civil Codex of the Russian Federation 
(United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, 1993). 
 
 Since September, 2006, the Proposed Special Technical Regulation on Space 
Technology Safety (Special TR) has been under discussion, and for the first time in 
Russian history, a space safety document has been prepared and publicly discussed.  The 
draft consists of six chapters and 20 articles that address many of the same issues as the 
Russian Space Activity Law, but goes further in its definition of dangers associated with 
space activity:   
 risk to cosmonauts, personnel from cosmodromes and other ground 
infrastructures, local population of the Russian Federation where the 
cosmodromes are located, employees of the rocket and space industry, the 
population of Russia, and populations of other countries, environment, and 
property; 
 damage to life and health, nature, property damage, and global catastrophes; and 
 launch, payload and propellant accidents, spacecraft failures, crashes, and 
subsequent deaths due to malfunctions or human error (Zhdanovich, 2010).   
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 RSA safety standards differ from those of ESA and NASA, and are part of the 
reliability and quality control programs that were part of the rules and regulations that 
were developed under Soviet control.  Various state national standards such as the System 
of Standards of Labour Safety, Systems of Hygienic Rules, and System of Environmental 
Protection Standards regulate human health and safety-related issues for spacecraft crew 
and ground personnel (Zhdanovich, 2010).  Should the U.S. and Russia cooperate in 
space tourism activities, safety regulations will need to be established that accommodate 
the standards of both states. 
Brussels I, 2000  
 On December 22, 2000, the European Union (E.U.) adopted Council Regulation 
No. 44/2001 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil 
and Commercial Matters (Brussels I).  This document clarified the effect of jurisdictional 
clauses in contracts as they relate to citizens of the E.U. 
 To be applicable, Brussels I requires that the parties are domiciled in different 
E.U. member states or that one party is domiciled in an E.U. member state and the other 
party in a non-E.U. member state, at the time of the conclusion of a contract between 
them.  For example, XCOR‘s principle place of business is California, however, if a 
space tourism contract is made through an agent in the Netherlands, XCOR is considered 
to reside in the Netherlands and the Dutch courts would have jurisdiction over a Dutch 
space tourist‘s claim against XCOR (Chatzipanagiotis, 2011).  
 The forum under which they agree to settle disputes must be clearly stated in 
writing in the contract (Chatzipanagiotis, 2011), which, according to Article 23(2), 
recognizing the nature of modern electronic communication includes  ―Any 
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communication by electronic means which provides a durable record of the agreement 
shall be equivalent to writing‖ (Council of the European Union, 2000).  This was a new 
idea for the new century, and not evident in previous domestic or international treaties or 
declarations. 
 Article 15 addresses ―special contracts‖ made between members of a trade or 
profession, and those who are not, such as a contract between a space tourism operator 
and a space tourist.  Section 1 states: 
(c) in all other cases, the contract has been concluded with a person who 
pursues commercial or professional activities in the Member State of 
the consumer's domicile or, by any means, directs such activities to 
that Member State or to several States including that Member State, 
and the contract falls within the scope of such activities (Council of the 
European Union, 2000). 
 
Section 3, however, states that  
This Section shall not apply to a contract of transportation other than a 
contract which, for an inclusive price, provides for a combination of travel 
and accommodation (Council of the European Union, 2000). 
 
For space tourism operators, this becomes particularly problematic if they include 
lodging for preflight training, extended orbital stays, or space hotel accommodations: 
To protect their clients from the application of the special rules, legal 
councils of operators of suborbital vehicles would argue that contracts for 
suborbital flights as such are contracts of transport.  Therefore, the forum-
selection clauses included by operators in the respective contracts are not 
covered by the Regulation‘s special provisions on consumers 
(Chatzipanagiotis, 2011). 
 
To add to the confusion, it is not certain whether Brussels I will even apply to space 
tourism, which may be superseded by international agreements and space treaties, 
depending on which states are signatories at the time that a contract is made 








VII. AVIATION INDUSTRY:  OPERATOR AND PASSENGER AGREEMENTS 
 
The prospects for both suborbital and orbital private human access to 
space give rise to some interesting and difficult legal questions.  It also 
opens up an exciting opportunity to develop an adequate system of legal 
regulation to deal with these activities.  The existing international legal 
regimes covering air and space activities are not well suited to large-scale 
commercial access to space, largely because they were developed at a time 
when such activities were not a principal consideration in the mind of the 
drafters.  The lack of legal clarity represents a major challenge and must 
be addressed as soon as possible, to provide for appropriate standards and 
further encourage (not discourage) such activities. 
 
       Tanja Masson-Zwaan and Steven Freeland 
       Between Heaven and Earth: The Legal  
      Challenges of Human Space Travel 
       Acta Astronautica, 2010 
 
 On October 9, 1890, in Brie, France, on the lawn of the Château d‘Armainvilliers, 
Clément Ader flew his bat-winged Éole prop plane, powered by an alcohol-burning 
steam engine, down a 200 meter runway.  He was the first to achieve powered flight 
(Historic Wings, 2012).  Thirteen years later, in 1903, the Wright Brothers flew at Kitty 
Hawk, opening the era of American flight transportation history.  The response was a 
legal regime for regulating commercial air transportation (Zhao, 2009) and an aviation 
industry about to transform the world. 
Warsaw Convention, 1929 
 The 1929 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to 
International Carriage by Air (Warsaw Convention) was signed by 23 states.  The 
Convention demonstrated international support for the commercial aviation industry, 
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defined passengers, baggage, and operations (Bromberg, 2005), provided an international 
regulatory structure for human and cargo transportation via air, and established liability 
limits, which could only be superseded due to willful misconduct of the air carrier (Reed, 
2009-2010). 
 Article 17 states:  
The carrier is liable for damage sustained in the event of the death or 
wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a 
passenger, if the accident which caused the damage so sustained took 
place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of 
embarking or disembarking (Warsaw Convention, 1929). 
 
Articles 20 and 21 define situations under which the carrier is not responsible:  
 
1.  The carrier is not liable if he proves that he and his agents have taken 
all necessary measures to avoid the damage or that it was impossible 
for him or them to take such measures. 
2.  In the carriage of goods and luggage the carrier is not liable if he 
proves that the damage was occasioned by negligent pilotage or 
negligence in the handling of the aircraft or in navigation and that, in 
all other respects, he and his agents have taken all necessary measures 
to avoid the damage (Warsaw Convention, 1929) 
 
and  
If the carrier proves that the damage was caused by or contributed to by 
the negligence of the injured person the Court may, in accordance with the 
provisions of its own law, exonerate the carrier wholly or partly from his 
liability (Warsaw Convention, 1929). 
 
This balanced liability structure was necessary since en masse air travel had just begun 
and air travel was still dangerous.  Most airlines, with the exception of those in the U.S., 
were owned by their governments. The limitation of liability also served to protect both 
the airlines and their governments (Abeyratne, 1997). 
 The convention's limited-liability provisions had two positive effects: capital 
could be used to invest in technological improvements and to expand into new 
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international markets; and the airlines were able to obtain insurance (Bromberg, 2005).  
The regime proved to be vital to the development of the air transportation industry by 
shielding the new airline industry from expensive insurance premiums and unlimited 
liability for accidents (Zhao, 2009).  The Warsaw Convention has successfully enabled 
companies to provide insurance services in the field of international air transportation and 
may prove to be a good model for the space tourism industry (Nase, 2012). 
Chicago Convention, 1944 
 The 1944 Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention) was 
signed by 52 states and established the U.N. ICAO, which has facilitated the development 
of international aviation for more than 60 years.  Article 1 reaffirms that ―The contracting 
States recognize that every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the 
airspace above its territory‖ (Chicago Convention, 1944).  Article 5 states:  
Each contracting State agrees that all aircraft of the other contracting States, being 
aircraft not engaged in scheduled international air services shall have the right, 
subject to the observance of the terms of this Convention, to make flights into or 
in transit non-stop across its territory and to make stops for non-traffic purposes 
without the necessity of obtaining prior permission, and subject to the right of the 
State flown over to require landing (Chicago Convention, 1944). 
 
Article 8 diverges from the situation that occurred 13 years later with the launch of 
Sputnik, and addresses pilotless aircraft: 
No aircraft capable of being flown without a pilot shall be flown without a 
pilot over a territory of a contracting state without special authorization by 
that state and in accordance with the terms of such authorization.  Each 
contracting state undertakes to insure that the flight of such aircraft 
without a pilot in regions open to civil aircraft shall be so controlled as to 
obviate danger to civil aircraft (Chicago Convention, 1944). 
 
 Article 44 assigns responsibilities to the ICAO, primarily to develop the principles 
and techniques of international air navigation and to foster the planning and development 
61 
of international air transport.  The ICAO Council has divided the airspace over the entire 
world into Flight Information Regions (FIRs) which also cover the seas (Marciacq et al., 
2010).  The ICAO may play a major role in the commercial space tourism industry. 
 Every commercial airline flight is dealt with by air traffic control, airport 
authorities, and pilots.  The system functions because of universally accepted regulations, 
Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs), created by the ICAO, covering safety, 
personnel licensing, aircraft operation, aerodromes, air traffic services, accident 
investigation, and the environment.  Most SARPS refer to technical regulations, so the  
Air Navigation Commission‘s (ANC) 15 technical experts play a predominant role in the 
SARP development (Jakhu and Nyampong, 2010).  Standards are defined as ―any 
specification whose uniform application is recognized as necessary for the safety or 
regularity of international air navigation and to which Contracting States will conform in 
accordance with the Convention;‖ a recommended practice is ―any specification whose 
uniform application is recognized as desirable for the safety, regularity, or efficiency of 
international air navigation‖ (Chicago Convention, 1944).   
 The convention and its related SARPs include several articles and requirements to 
facilitate international flight.  For example, SARPS require that  
 any pilot who wishes to fly on an aircraft registered in a State other than the one 
that has issued the license, needs to obtain an authorization from the State of 
Registry; 
 pilots and controllers shall use ICAO standardized phraseology in all situations 
for which it has been specified and resort to plain language… 
communications only when standardized phraseology cannot serve an intended 
transmission (United Nations International Civil Aviation Organization, 2014). 
 
Amendment 164 to Annex 1 of the Chicago Convention strengthened language 
proficiency requirements for flight crew members and air traffic controllers: 
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―pilots on international flights shall demonstrate language proficiency in 
either English or the language used by the station on the ground. 
Controllers working on stations serving designated airports and routes 
used by international air services shall demonstrate language proficiency 
in English as well as in any other language(s) used by the station on the 
ground‖ (United Nations International Civil Aviation Organization, 2014). 
 
 Changes to the convention and its associated SARPs over the following decades 
reflected huge increases in the number of passengers, modernized airports, new 
destinations, and modified, international liability regimes (Zhao, 2009).  Space tourism 
regulations will likely require similar modifications to meet increasing international space 
tourist demands. 
Rome I, 1952 
 The 1952 Convention on Damage Caused by Foreign Aircraft to Third Parties on 
the Surface (Rome I), went beyond the 1929 Warsaw Convention, which had not 
addressed air carrier liability for those injured on the ground as a result of air 
transportation mishaps.  Article 1(1) of Rome I stated: 
1. Any person who suffers damage on the surface shall, upon proof only that the 
damage was caused by an aircraft in flight or by any person or thing falling 
therefrom, be entitled to compensation as provided by this Convention 
(United Nations International Civil Aviation Organization, 1952). 
   
Article 2 defined ―operator:‖ 
1. The liability for compensation contemplated by Article 1 of this Convention 
shall attach to the operator of the aircraft. 
2. (a) For the purposes of this Convention the term ―operator‖ shall mean the 
person who was making use of the aircraft at the time the damage was caused, 
provided that if control of the navigation of the aircraft was retained by the 
person from whom the right to make use of the aircraft was derived, whether 
directly or indirectly, that person shall be considered the operator (United 
Nations International Civil Aviation Organization, 1952). 
 
Article 14 of Rome I also reaffirmed, clarified, and limited liability: 
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If the total amount of the claims established exceeds the limit of  
liability applicable under the provisions of this Convention, the following  
rules shall apply, taking into account the provisions of paragraph 2 of  
Article 11: 
(a) If the claims are exclusively in respect of loss of life or personal injury 
or exclusively in respect of damage to property, such claims shall be 
reduced in proportion to their respective amounts. 
(b) If the claims are both in respect of loss of life or personal injury and in 
respect of damage to property, one half of the total sum distributable 
shall be appropriated preferentially to meet claims in respect of loss of 
life and personal injury and, if insufficient, shall be distributed 
proportionately between the claims concerned.  The remainder of the 
total sum distributable shall be distributed proportionately among the 
claims in respect of damage to property and the portion not already 
covered of the claims in respect of loss of life and personal injury 
(United Nations International Civil Aviation Organization, 1952).  
 
Liability issues would be revisited in several laws during the next 50 years with the 
dramatic rise in the number of airline passengers and the increase in the diversity of 
destinations around the world. 
Intercarrier Agreement on Passenger Liability, 1995 
 The International Air Transportation Association (IATA), the trade association for 
the world‘s airlines, is headquartered in Montreal, as is the ICAO, and represents 240 
airlines, 84% of world-wide air traffic (International Air Transportation Association, 
2013).  In October, 1995, IATA unanimously passed the Intercarrier Agreement on 
Passenger Liability (IAPL), which set the standard for international compliance and 
modernized private air law, subject to governmental approval.  The initiative focused 
serious weaknesses of private international air law (Abeyratne, 1997).  At less than a 
page in length, and consisting of eight concise articles, the document is by far the 
simplest international air-related agreement: 
1.  To take action to waive the limitation of liability on recoverable compensatory 
damages in Article 22 paragraph 1 of the Warsaw Convention as to claims for 
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death, wounding or other bodily injury of a passenger within the meaning of 
Article 17 of the Convention, so that recoverable compensatory damages may 
be determined and awarded by reference to the law of the domicile of the 
passenger.  
2.  To reserve all available defences pursuant to the provisions of the Convention; 
nevertheless, any carrier may waive any defence, including the waiver of any 
defence up to a specified monetary amount of recoverable compensatory 
damages, as circumstances may warrant.  
3.  To reserve their rights of recourse against any other person, including rights of 
contribution or indemnity, with respect to any sums paid by the carrier.  
4.  To encourage other airlines involved in the international carriage of 
passengers to apply the terms of this Agreement to such carriage.  
5.  To implement the provisions of this Agreement no later than 1 November 
1996 or upon receipt of requisite government approvals, whichever is later.  
6.  That nothing in this Agreement shall affect the rights of the passenger or the 
claimant otherwise available under the Convention.  
7.  That this Agreement may be signed in any number of counterparts, all of 
which shall constitute one Agreement. Any carrier may become a party to this 
Agreement by signing a counterpart hereof and depositing it with the Director 
General of the International Air Transport Association (IATA).  
8.  That any carrier party hereto may withdraw from this Agreement by giving 
twelve (12) months‘ written notice of withdrawal to the Director General of 
IATA and to the other carriers parties to the Agreement (International Air 
Transportation Association, 1995).  
 
The importance of this document is its demonstration of the willingness of industry 
representatives to find solutions that would benefit their customers (Abeyratne, 1997), 
and that this could be accomplished by addressing a long standing treaty, the Warsaw 
Convention, as well as by acknowledging more modern issues, resulting from the 
international and ubiquitous status of air travel.  Documents of this clarity and simplicity 









VIII. ANTARCTICA: PRESERVATION AND PROTECTION 
 
If it had been practicable…at an earlier stage of Arctic and Antarctic 
exploration and development which it was also not in the political climate 
of the time, to devise and international regime for the polar regions such as 
was suggested by the United States in August 1948 with the support of the 
United Kingdom and New Zealand, a number of acute current [1955-56] 
controversies and problems would not have arisen.  It would be entirely 
fitting that the control of activities in space should be regarded as a world 
responsibility…(Jenks, 1956). 
 
 Antarctica has the cleanest air in the world, and is the ideal terrestrial station at 
which to measure the effects of global pollution and carbon dioxide levels.  It is also the 
darkest land on Earth, and an excellent setting for astronomical research.  Subjected to 
winds up to 250 miles per hour and temperatures as low as -50
0
 centigrade, Antarctica 
has the world‘s most delicate ecosystem, where a footprint in moss can last for decades 
(Greenpeace U.S.A., 2013).  Scientists also study its extensive food chain to better 
understand the environmental impacts of and by humans. 
 On August 28, 1948, the U.S. Department of State released Discussions Asked on 
Territorial Problems in Antarctica, based on discussions with Argentina, Australia, 
Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway, and the United Kingdom.  In this document the 
Department of State suggested that territorial problems in Antarctica could be resolved 
through the promotion of scientific research and internationalization.  While not 
recognized at the time, these ideas were later applied to space law (Doyle, 2002). 
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 Antarctica was once the domain of explorers such as Shackleton, Amundsen, and 
Scott.  After the pole was reached in 1911, more explorations followed, and by the 1950s, 
several states had erected scientific research stations.  In December, 1956, commercial 
tourism began with a LAN Chile DC-6 conducting an overflight tour.  The first ship-
based tours, out of Chile and Argentina, began in 1958, and by 1969, cruise ship visits 
became common (Spennemann, 2007). 
Antarctic Treaty, 1959 
 On December 1, 1959, the governments of Argentina, Australia, Belgium, the 
French Republic, Japan, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the 
United States, signed the Antarctic Treaty, outside the auspices of the U.N.  This treaty 
entered into force on June 23, 1961.  These states, per Article IX of the treaty, comprise 
the entity referred to as the Contracting Parties.  Since 1959, thirty-eight other countries 
have acceded to the Treaty (Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty, 1959). 
 Parties recognized 
that it is in the interest of all mankind that Antarctica shall continue 
forever to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall not become 
the scene or object of international discord...Convinced that the 
establishment of a firm foundation for the continuation and development 
of such cooperation on the basis of freedom of scientific investigation in 
Antarctica as applied during the International Geophysical Year accords 
with the interests of science and the progress of all mankind (Secretariat of 
the Antarctic Treaty, 1959).  
 
 Article I of the treaty prohibits the use of military weapons, fortifications, 
maneuvers, or weapons but allows for the use of military personnel and equipment for 
scientific research; Articles II and III addresses the nature of the cooperative exchange of 
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scientific ideas and discoveries; and Article IV provided that claims made before treaty 
enforcement would continue to be acknowledged:   
No acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty is in force shall 
constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial 
sovereignty in Antarctica or create any rights or create any rights of 
sovereignty in Antarctica.  No new claim, or enlargement of an existing 
claim, to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall be asserted while the 
present Treaty is in force (Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty, 1959).  
 
This meant that existing territorial claims would be honored, but no new claims could be 
made by treaty signatories. 
 Territorial claims are based on a combination of two different legal principles:  
the principle of discovery and occupation and the principle of contiguity.  Discovery 
alone is not considered sufficient for obtaining title under international law; legal scholars 
also consider effective occupation as an additional and necessary criterion on which to 
base resource ownership.  The definition of effective occupation, however, is nebulous, 
especially in Antarctica, where harsh conditions prevent many of the overt activities of 
normal, temperate climates from occurring.  Some claimant countries, including Chile 
and Argentina, have conducted Antarctic activities, including visits by heads of state, 
marriage ceremonies, and the issuance of postage stamps, in an attempt to demonstrate 
effective occupation (Westermeyer, 1982). 
 Sections 2 and 3 of Article VII of the treaty are of particular importance because 
they enabled treaty signatories to designate observers who  
shall have complete freedom of access at any time to any or all areas of 
Antarctica…including all stations, installation and equipment within those 
areas, and all ships and aircraft at points of discharging or embarking 
cargoes or personnel in Antarctica, shall be open at all times to inspection 
by any observers…(Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty, 1959). 
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Section 5 states that Contracting Parties ―shall give them notice in advance of all 
expeditions to and within Antarctica‖ (Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty, 1959).  
 Article VIII delegated responsibility for ―members of the staffs 
accompanying any such persons,‖ stating that they 
shall be subject only to the jurisdiction of the Contracting Party of which 
they are nationals in respect of all acts or omissions occurring while they 
are in Antarctica for the purpose of exercising their functions (Secretariat 
of the Antarctic Treaty, 1959). 
 
 Sections 1 and 2 of Article IX address dispute resolution procedures: 
1)  If any dispute arises between two or more of the Contracting Parties 
concerning the interpretation or application of the present Treaty, those 
Contracting Parties shall consult among themselves with a view to 
having the dispute resolved by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, 
conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement or other peaceful means of 
their own choice. 
2)  Any dispute of this character not so resolved shall, with the consent, in 
each case, of all parties to the dispute, be referred to the International 
Court of Justice for settlement; but failure to reach agreement on 
reference to the International Court shall not absolve parties to the 
dispute from the responsibility of continuing to seek to resolve it by 
any of the various peaceful means…(British Antarctic Survey, 1959). 
 
 The 1959 Antarctic Treaty has been supplemented by more than two hundred 
agreements, ratified via the ATCM process, and providing a flexible, incremental system 
that does not require modifications to the original treaty.  The ATS is better prepared to 
tackle future challenges related to tourism far better than any existing space treaties.  On 
September 22, 1960, President Eisenhower agreed, recommending that Antarctic Treaty 
principles be used as a model for an international agreement governing space (Simberg, 
2012).  This treaty established the principles of the legal regime of scientific exploration 
of Antarctica on the basis of experience gained during the International Geophysical Year 
(IGY) and later became an example for the regulation of space activities (Kopal, 2008), 
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specifically the Outer Space Treaty, and most of the operational features of the unratified 
Moon Treaty mutual inspection system (Peterson, 1997). 
Antarctic Treaty System 
 Several Antarctic treaties followed as part of the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS), 
each with the primary objective of conserving Antarctica‘s resources.  On June 2, 1964 
the Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora was drafted, 
however, there was little urgency in enforcing this treaty. 
 Prior to the 1970s there was little evidence that minerals existed in commercially 
exploitable quantities.  There were four constraints that limited our knowledge of 
Antarctica‘s resources:  Antarctica has been viewed by some states as a preserve outside 
the domain of commercial enterprise; the technology, needed to extract non-living 
resources from the Antarctic continent and its surrounding ocean, would need to operate 
under extremely harsh conditions and with potentially limited human interaction; and 
some resources would simply be unattainable for months at a time because ice would 
prevent equipment from reaching sites where resources were available or from shipping 
them to locations where they could be utilized (Westermeyer, 1982). 
 Additional Antarctic treaties and conventions, aimed at preserving Antarctica‘s 
living resources became part of the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS):  the 1972 Convention 
for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (British Antarctic Survey, 1972), the 1980 
Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMRL) 
(Antarctic Cooperative Research Center, 1980), and the 1982 Agreed Measures for the 
Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora. (U.S Department of State, 2014). 
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Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resources, 1988 
 The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resources (Mineral 
Resources Convention) was never ratified, but reflected the future Outer Space Treaty.  
Article 4 of the proposed treaty stated that no Antarctic mineral resource activity shall 
take place until it is judged that 
technology and procedures are available to provide for safe operations and 
compliance…there exists the capacity to monitor key environmental 
parameters and ecosystem components so as to identify any adverse 
effects of such activity and to provide for the modification of operating 
procedures as may be necessary in the light of the results of monitoring or 
increased knowledge of the Antarctic environment or dependent or 
associated ecosystems; and there exists the capacity to respond effectively 
to accidents, particularly those with potential environmental effects. 
(Antarctic Cooperative Research Center, 1988). 
 
 According to Greenpeace, the 1989 the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska severely 
undermined the oil company's argument that drilling in ecologically sensitive areas could 
be conducted in a safe environmentally friendly manner. Greenpeace offices worldwide 
lobbied their governments to take a responsible position on protecting the Antarctic, 
joining forces with other non-governmental organizations, eliciting support from Prince 
Sadruddin Aga Khan, Jacques Cousteau, and Ted Turner, leading to additional 
environmental protections for Antarctica (Greenpeace U.S.A., 2013). Greenpeace‘s 
tactics are frequently controversial, but the organization was clearly correct in its 
evaluation for the need of international protection of Antarctic resources. 
Protocol on Environmental Protection, 1991 
 The 1991 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty 
(Environmental Protection Protocol) prohibits any activity related to mineral resources 
except for scientific research.  Annexes are aimed at mitigating specific environmental 
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problems: Annex I defines conditions for environmental evaluation, monitoring, 
circulation of information, and conditions warranting emergency status; Annex II 
provides additional protections for native flora and fauna as well as strict permitting 
requirements for species introduced for scientific investigations; and Annex III describes 
the procedures for the removal of waste, including radioactive materials, electrical 
batteries, liquid and solid fuels and drums, toxic heavy metals, materials that produced 
harmful emissions when incinerated, and sewage domestic liquid wastes (Secretariat of 
the Antarctic Treaty, 1991). 
 Annexes V and VI provide the most constructive lessons for space tourism law.  
Annex V, Article 3, section 1 establishes that  
Any area, including any marine area, may be designated as an Antarctic 
Specially Protected Area to protect outstanding environmental, scientific, 
historic, aesthetic or wilderness values, any combination of those values, 
or ongoing or planned scientific research (Secretariat of the Antarctic 
Treaty, 1991). 
 
 The other type of designation for site protection at a lower level, is described in 
Article 4 as the Antarctic Specially Managed Area, where no special visitation permits 
are required.  The power to determine whether to designate a site for protection, and what 
level of protection is appropriate falls to the Committee on Environmental Protection 
(CEP), described in Article 6.  This committee, established by the protocol, is comprised 
of one representative from each of the parties to the CEP (Walsh, 2012).  Article 7 
describes the process required to obtain a permit describing the activities that would be 
undertaken in a preserved area, and Article 8 stated that  
Sites or monuments of recognised historic value which have been 
designated as Antarctic Specially Protected Areas or Antarctic Specially 
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Managed Areas, or which are located within such Areas, shall be listed as 
Historic Sites and Monuments (Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty, 1991). 
 
 Annex VI addresses environmental emergencies, contingency plans, financial 
liability, limitations and exemptions to liability.  Article 10 states that 
A Party shall not be liable for the failure of an operator, other than its State 
operators, to take response action to the extent that that Party took 
appropriate measures within its competence, including the adoption of 
laws and regulations, administrative actions and enforcement measures, to 
ensure compliance with this Annex (Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty, 
1991).  
 
Article 12 provides for the Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty to administer a fund for the 
reimbursement of the reasonable and justified costs incurred by a Party or Parties in 
taking response action to mitigate environmental disasters.  Section 3 addresses special 
circumstances where  
the fact that the responsible operator was an operator of the Party seeking 
reimbursement; the identity of the responsible operator remaining 
unknown or not subject to the provisions of this Annex; the unforeseen 
failure of the relevant insurance company or financial institution; or an 
exemption in Article 8 applying, shall be duly taken into account by the 
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting...(Secretariat of the Antarctic 
Treaty, 1991).   
 
In the event of inaction or ineffective response to an emergency, this article also provides 
an arbitration system in the case where individual or joint liability in emergencies was 
disputed or in question.  Annex VI was adopted but an actual agreement on liability was 
never achieved.  The strict liability system established by this annex is not in force, and 
by 2011 has been ratified only by Spain, Peru, Poland and Sweden (Aneiros, 2011). 
 Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties (ATCPs) have never claimed responsibility 
over Antarctic tourism.  Their self-assumed responsibility for governance of Antarctica 
and its environment has lead the U.N. to agree that the ATS and its regulatory efforts 
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supported the principles and purposes of the U.N. charter and the interest of mankind 
(Molenaar, 2005).  This is an important point because it implies that the U.N. will defer 
to the ATCPs to self-regulate legal disputes. 
 Dispute resolution is often determined by considering international policy, 
politics, and forum shopping, and it has also been argued that the ATCPs self-assumed 
responsibility for Antarctica has established it as legally obligated to resolve any 
Antarctic-related legal questions (Molenaar, 2005).  The difficulty in applying this 
reasoning becomes most evident when ATCPs are unable to enforce ATS stipulations on 
non-ATCPs, effectively undermining the purpose and legitimacy of the treaties and the 
ATCPs: 
The fundamental international law principle of pacta tertiis stipulates that 
States cannot be bound by rules of international law unless they have in 
one way or another consented to them.  An important disadvantage of the 
agreement to disagree in the Antarctic Treaty is that it does not provide or 
assert a basis under general international law by which non-parties to the 
Treaty can be bound, with obvious implications for effectiveness of 
governance. If a form of joint sovereignty or condominium had been opted 
for instead, this would have offered such a basis (Molenaar, 2005). 
  
 It been argued that the ATS is an ―objective regime,‖ which is capable of creating 
erga omnes, towards all rights and obligations, regulating the conduct of non-ATCPs, but 
this  
theory of objective regimes belongs to the arena of international law, it 
relies to a significant extent on universal acceptance and this is also at the 
heart of the notion of (international) legitimacy… (Molenaar, 2005).   
 
ATCPs, and the ATS have received international support for several decades; there has 
been little need to invoke the theory of objective regimes because ATCPs have strictly 
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observed the pacta tertiis principle, and non-ATCP states still have little direct 
involvement in Antarctic activities (Molenaar, 2005). 
International Association of Antarctic Tourism Operators, 1991 
 The International Association of Antarctic Tourism Operators (IAATO) was 
founded in 1991 by seven tour operators, with the objective ―to advocate, promote and 
practice safe and environmentally responsible travel to the Antarctic‖ (International 
Association of Antarctic Tour Operators, 2013).  For more than 30 years, approximately 
2,000 tourists visited Antarctica each year (Bastmeijer, 2003).  By 1994, with the 
convenience of air and sea travel, visiting tourists outnumbered scientists for the first 
time; several thousand tourists a year now arrive via plane and cruise ships, for eclipse-
viewing expeditions, skiing, snowboarding, mountain climbing, iceberg expeditions, 
kayaking, marathons, long distance swimming, scuba diving, helicopter flights, film 
projects, new product testing, and meteorite hunting.  Many of these activities seem out 
of alignment with the limitations proposed by the ATS (Bastmeijer, 2003). 
 With more than 90 current members (Bowermaster, 2007), IAATO has been very 
successful in showing the value of its work to the ATCPs (Pérez-Salom, 2000-2001).  
IAATO bylaws abide by ATS articles on waste management and interference with 
Antarctica flora and fauna, value judgments on allowable tourist activities are not 
specifically addressed (Bastmeijer, 2003).  By 2003, parties to the ATS had agreed to 
discourage risky activities and to distinguish among those deemed responsible and 
irresponsible tourist activities, at least in principle, but little formal action was taken 
(Bastmeijer, 2003).  Activities such as skiing, mountain climbing, kayaking, and scuba 
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diving, can be done elsewhere with considerably less environmental impact and far less 
risk. 
Declaration on Antarctic Tourism, 1998 
 In an effort to mitigate the potential damage caused by tourists, the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) Declaration on Antarctic Tourism was adopted on December 1, 
1998, by the WTO Executive Council at its 59th meeting held at Ushuaia, Argentina.  
This document addressed the peculiarities of the Antarctic ecosystem, declaring that 
states were responsible for the Antarctic tourist activities of their nationals which were to 
be carried out in a manner that did not damage the Antarctic ecosystem (Pérez-Salom, 
2000-2001). 
 Questions about tourists‘ use of Antarctica are equally applicable to the space 
environment:  Should parts of Antarctica be permanently preserved from tourist 
activities?  Should certain activities, especially those that can be more safely undertaken 
elsewhere, be banned?  Should structural facilities, such as hotels, visitor centers, and 
platforms, be restricted? (Bastmeijer, 2005)  Bastmeijer‘s questions are rhetorical.  No 
sound argument can be made for allowing tourists or Antarctic tourism companies to 
behave without restraint; failing to do so would have unforeseen and potentially 
irreparable consequences which could ruin the Antarctic environment, render it useless 
for activities of any kind, and  permanently destroy its unique fauna and flora. 
Insurance and Contingency Planning for Tourism, 2004 
 In 2004 the Antarctic Treaty Parties adopted Measure 4 The Insurance and 
Contingency Planning for Tourism and Non-Governmental Activities in the Antarctic 
Treaty Area.  It requires tourism operators under the jurisdiction of Antarctic Treaty 
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parties to demonstrate contingency plans and sufficient arrangements for health and 
safety, search and rescue, and medical care and evacuation, without relying on support 
from other operators or programs without written agreement.  Measure 4 has not entered 
into force, but IAATO members voluntarily follow it (Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty, 
2004). 
 The range of tourism activities currently available on Antarctica did not exist even 
a few decades ago, and human imagination will arrive at ever riskier adventures, such as 
those demonstrated in the X Games and via the Darwin Awards, and through activities 
such as bungee jumping and sky diving, challenging the tenets of the ATS and its 
signatories.  Antarctic motorcross events, weddings, survival courses, hotels or casinos, 
and vehicle testing facilities (Bastmeijer, 2003) are among the possibilities that may be 
faced in the immediate future.   
 Tourism can interfere with scientific endeavors, including fishery, avian, and 
mammal population studies, biological and geological surveys, and shipping related to 
the movement of scientific equipment and support operations.  Risks to the pristine 
Antarctic ecosystem, however, have the most severe consequences, since the damage 
tends to be long-term or irreversible.  Human interaction in more familiar and accessible 
environments has demonstrated that humans have a unique ability to inflict damage 
without considering the potential impact (Molenaar, 2005).  Without regulations to 
govern interaction with the Antarctic environment, our species would undoubtedly find 
other means to simultaneously injure ourselves and the Antarctic environment. 
 Antarctic tourism does, however, have its benefits, primarily the creation of 
―ambassadors for Antarctic conservation and science‖ (Molenaar, 2005).  Exposing a 
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growing number of Antarctic tourists and crews to this fragile, unique, and extreme 
environment increases world-wide awareness of the dangers that it, and other delicate 
environments face.  Cruise lines have also begun to educate their employees about 
environmental protection, creating programs to encourage crewmembers to submit 
suggestions to improve environmental procedures and policies (Wright, 2008-2009). 
 Lee (2005) recommended that sovereignty in Antarctica be relinquished and that a 
single authority, the ICJ, become the sole arbiter of disputes.  He proposed that this 
would eliminate a need for consensus, states would be required to appear before the 
Court, individuals would no longer be excluded from legal standing, and offenses of any 
nature, whether the abuse of governmental power or an affront to the environment, would 
be resolved in the same tribunal.  Political pressure imposed by more powerful states 
would be neutralized and global justice in Antarctica could potentially be achieved.   He 
rejected the idea of allowing the U.N. to resolve legal issues in Antarctica, because it 
behaves as a horizontal institution, rather than a vertical one, controlled by powerful 
governments. 
 Antarctic treaties and oversight cannot guarantee environmental preservation, 
tourist safety and good behavior, international cooperation, scientific success, and 
appropriate resource management.  Without legal agreements, however, none of these is 









IX. INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION:  SAFETY, TRAINING, AND 
MEDICINE 
 
The reality of human nature is such that as humankind settles in space, 
whether on celestial objects such as the Moon or planets, or in space 
stations orbiting planets or traversing into the unknown, law and order 
must be maintained on board these settlements.  How such order is 
maintained, and what law will be used to do so, will by necessity, and 
ideally by choice, be the result of careful thought, consideration, and 
negotiation. 
 
Hans P. Sinha 
Criminal Jurisdiction on the International 
Space Station, 2004 
 
International Governmental Agreement, 1998 
 The 1998 Agreement Among the Government of Canada, Governments of 
Member States of the European Space Agency, the Government of Japan, the 
Government of the Russian Federation, and the Government of the United States of 
America Concerning Cooperation on the Civil International Space Station (1998 IGA), 
an updated version of the 1988 agreement, that now includes Russia.  This agreement is 
not a treaty, but in most states, including the U.S., where it is considered a 
―Congressional-Executive agreement,‖ it carries the weight of a treaty (Sinha, 2004).   
 International space agreements that address jurisdiction must consider existing 
international law, state laws, and inter-agency codes governing the conduct of humankind 
in space.  Criminal jurisdiction in space, for example, can be defined as ―the competence 
of a state to prescribe and apply policy with respect to particular events defined as 
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criminal by the state in question, and occurring in outer space‖ (Sinha, 2004), and 
pertains to a state‘s ability to extend or exert its sovereign powers over a territory or into 
space.  States have chosen to apply their individual criminal laws to acts occurring in 
outer space, but have agreed, as ISS partners to enact a single criminal code specifically 
for the ISS (Sinha, 2004).  
 The 1998 IGA clearly defines criminal jurisdiction on the ISS.  Article 5 provides 
the general jurisdictional framework which relies upon the principles of territoriality and 
nationality.  The territoriality principle is invoked by a partner registering its ISS flight 
element in accordance with the Article II of the Registration Convention, a state can then, 
pursuant to Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty, retain jurisdiction over that flight 
element.  Article 5(2) also provides a jurisdictional foundation based on the nationality 
principle, stating that ―each Partner shall retain jurisdiction and control over the elements 
it registers…‖ and can retain jurisdiction over not only acts occurring in one of its flight 
elements, but also over acts committed by its nationals regardless of on or in which flight 
element that national may commit an offense (Sinha, 2004). 
 Article 16 defines ―launch vehicle‖ as an object intended for launch, launched 
from or returning to Earth which carries payloads, persons, or both, and a ―payload‖ as 
property to be flown or used on or in a launch vehicle or the ISS.  More importantly, this 
article also addresses cross-waiver of liability (National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration and the European Space Agency, 1998), defined as 
a set of promises made by parties to an agreement in which each of the parties 
pledges not to sue the other for damages caused by the other, except under 
specific circumstances.  Moreover, each party also pledges that not only will it not 
sue the other, but also it will ensure that any entity related to it will not sue the 
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other or any entity related to the other, except, again, in those same very few, and 
very limited, circumstances (Mirmina, 2012). 
 
This is of particular interest, since it both deviates from and adheres to parts of the 
Liability Convention, which holds that states are strictly liable for damage caused on 
Earth by space objects, depending on close cooperation among partner states with the 
goal of strengthening strong space-based relationships (Zhao, 2004).   
 Article 22(2) addresses the international nature of activities aboard the ISS, and 
situations where misconduct among personnel of different states has the potential to 
affect prosecutorial interest (Sinha, 2004): 
in a case of misconduct in orbit that: (a) affects the life or safety of a 
national of another Partner State or (b) occurs in or on or causes damage to 
the flight element of another Partner State, the Partner State whose 
national is the alleged perpetrator shall, at the request of any affected 
Partner State, consult with such State concerning their respective 
prosecutorial interests (National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
and the European Space Agency, 1998). 
 
Article 22(3) is an innovative solution to the issue of non-terrestrial extradition.  It 
addresses the situation where no extradition treaty exists between two states, for example, 
between the U.S. and Russia (Sinha, 2004): 
If a Partner State which makes extradition conditional on the existence of 
a treaty receives a request for extradition from another Partner State with 
which it has no extradition treaty, it may at its option consider this 
Agreement as the legal basis for extradition in respect of the alleged 
misconduct on orbit.  Extradition shall be subject to the procedural 
provisions and the other conditions of the law of the requested Partner 
State (National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the European 
Space Agency, 1998). 
  
As Sinha (2004) stated: 
Whatever legal framework is eventually adopted for future space 
settlements, whether on celestial bodies, or in space stations, the criminal 
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jurisdiction will certainly be influenced by, if not patterned on, the 
principles agreed upon in Article 22 of the 1998 IGA. 
 
Crew Code of Conduct, 2000 
 The 2000 Code of Conduct for the International Space Station Crew (ISS Code of 
Conduct) is the ―core document‖ (Brünner and Soucek, 2007) defining astronaut behavior 
aboard the ISS.  The ISS Code of Conduct establishes ―a clear chain of command on-
orbit,‖ ―a clear relationship between ground and on-orbit management,‖ and sets ―forth 
standards for work and activities in space‖ (National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration and the European Space Agency, 2000).  Section 2 provides that all 
aspects of flight, including safety, general standards of behavior: 
pre-flight, on-orbit and post-flight activities, they shall comply with the 
ISS Commander's orders, all Flight and ISS program rules, operational 
directives and management policies, as applicable.  These include those 
related to safety, health, well-being, security and other operational or 
management matters governing all aspects of ISS elements, equipment, 
payloads and facilities, and non-ISS facilities, to which they have access… 
(National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the European Space 
Agency, 2000).  
 
Crew Selection, 2001 
 In 2001, the ISS Multilateral Crew Operations Panel (MCOP) was charged with 
―defining the processes, standards and criteria for selection, assignment, training, and 
certification of Space Station crew for flight.‖  The MCOP Principles Regarding 
Processes and Criteria for Selection, Assignment, Training and Certification of ISS 
(Expedition and Visiting) Crewmembers: Revision A (ISS Crew Selection) defined four 
different categories for space travelers: 
 a professional astronaut/cosmonaut is an individual who has completed the 
official selection and has been qualified as such at the space agency of one of 
the ISS partners and is employed on the staff of the crew office of that agency; 
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 a space flight participant is an individual engaged in commercial, scientific, 
engineering, educational, journalistic, artistic, tourist or other programs or 
activities, or a crewmember of non-partner space agency, sponsored by one or 
more partners, as part of a short-term contract;  
 an expedition, or main crewmember responsible for implementing planned 
activities; and  
 a visiting crewmember, usually an astronaut or cosmonaut, who travels to or 
from the ISS, but is not part of the expedition crew. 
 
The ISS Crew Selection agreement provides a list of conditions that would be used to 
disqualify potential crewmembers, including  
criminal, dishonest, infamous, or notoriously disgraceful conduct; 
intentional false statement or fraud in examination or appointment; 
habitual use of intoxicating beverages to excess; abuse of narcotics, drugs, 
or other controlled substances 
 
and allowed for consideration of the ―age of person at time of the misconduct‖ and 
―contributing social or environmental conditions‖ (International Space Station 
Multilateral Crew Operations Panel, 2001).  Crew members are also required to meet 
medical standards, and sponsoring agencies need to consider a candidate‘s  
relevant operational experience; demonstrated performance under stress; 
ability to function as a team member; high moral integrity; 
adaptability/flexibility; and motivation consistent with the program 
mission (International Space Station Multilateral Crew Operations Panel, 
2001). 
 
Selection criteria for space tourists will not have to meet the same strict requirements, but 
boundaries will need to be established for acceptable behavior and medical fitness.  
 According to MCOP definitions, there are clear distinctions between space flight 
participants, and crew members.  Many space tourists will want to engage in at least 
some of the activities defined by the MCOP on both short- and long-duration flights, and 
these definitions, along with suitable selection criteria and codes of conduct, can be used 
to enforce appropriate behavior.  These became relevant before Tito‘s 2002 flight to the 
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ISS, which raised concerns among ISS partners from Europe, Canada, Japan, and the 
U.S.  They requested that the RSA ensure that Tito would not risk the safety of the ISS 
crew, and objected because Tito had not completed mandated MCOP training, his 
presence was not appropriate given the intensity of the on-orbit operations during the 
proposed flight, and RSA had not followed appropriate legal and administrative steps to 
include Tito on the flight (Spaceref.com, 2001).  After further discussion, the Multilateral 
Coordination Board (MCB) agreed to allow Tito to visit the ISS provided that he 
assumed personal monetary liability for any damage he caused and that he consented to 
not file claim against any ISS partner in the case of any injuries he suffered.  Because 
Russia had already agreed to allow Tito‘s ISS visit, it was forced to take out a $100,000 
insurance policy to comply with the demands of the ISS partners.  Satisfied by the 
success of his trip to the ISS, NASA and the other partners agreed to visits by other space 
tourists (Failat, 2012). 
Medical Standards, 2002 
 The purpose of common physical and psychological medical standards, evaluation 
lists, and regulations is to certify crewmembers and space tourists, develop in-flight 
procedures, address environmental issues, and create post-flight rehabilitation schemes 
after long-duration flights.  Once the RSA began offering space tourists seats on Soyuz 
vehicles in order to visit the ISS, specific criteria were needed to define space tourist 
selection to ensure that they would meet minimum health standards and that they would 
not endanger the crew or the mission.  The first document specifically addressed 
requirements for space tourists, who would be on the ISS for less than 30 days.  The 
Medical Standards and Certification Procedures for Space Flight Participants (Medical 
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Standards) was approved in May, 2002, and provides the partners with the authority to 
medically certify space tourists (Duncan et al., 2008).  
Balance Agreement, 2006 
 In 2006, NASA and the Federal Space Agency of the Russian Federation signed 
the Second Addendum to the Implementing Arrangement Entitled “Protocol Including 
Terms, Conditions and Assumptions, Summary Balance of Contribution and Obligations 
to International Space Station (ISS) and Resulting Rights of NASA and RSA to ISS 
Utilization Accommodations and Resources, and Flight Opportunities” (Balance 
Agreement).  Noteworthy for its lengthy title, it recognizes that space-related activities 
are dynamic, rather than static, enterprises:  
The specific objectives of this Addendum are to establish common 
approaches to key operational issues and effect a Balance Agreement 
Addendum partial rebalance of the NASA and Roscosmos efforts until 
such time as a more complete evaluation and comprehensive rebalance can 
be completed through future adjustments of the Balance Agreement 
(National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Federal Space 
Agency of the Russian Federation, 2006). 
 
It also lists specific responsibilities of NASA and the RSA, including those related to 
crew size, safety, habitation, stowage, propellant, and waste removal requirements.  
Article 5 requires that all space activities will be conducted under the respective laws of 
the United States and Russia.  Article 6 allows for amendments, Article 7 allows for new 
agreements to supersede the existing agreement, and Article 8 allows parties to withdraw 
(National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Federal Space Agency of the 









X. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Lessons from the Aviation Industry 
…the label of ‗space tourism‘ is too limited as a legal category: its focus 
on the motivation (for pleasure, as opposed to science or training) as the 
decisive criterion to set these activities apart from more traditional 
spaceflight is a doubtful legal distinguisher.  For purposes of air law (one 
of the areas of law often referred to in the context of legal issues 
concerning space tourism), for example, the motivation for someone to 
take a flight is basically irrelevant.  
 
 Frans G. von der Dunk  
 Space Tourism, Private Spaceflight and the 
Law: Key Aspects, 2011 
 
ICAO and Space Tourism Oversight  
 A March, 2010 FAA report noted the importance of airspace traffic management 
and that no single federal agency currently has total responsibility for the operations of 
U.S. commercial space flights, and that neither aviation regulations nor current space-
related laws consider even suborbital space flight.  The report also confirmed that the 
ICAO would be in the best position to develop safe and orderly regulations for 
commercial space tourism transportation (Nase, 2012).  Incorporating international space 
tourism under the ICAO, per the Chicago Convention and its annexes, would support 
consistent international standards and recommended practices for space transportation 
and create an effective mechanism for their implementation at the international level 
(Jakhu and Nyampong, 2010). 
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 The lobbying effort to create an international ICAO for commercial space flight 
began in 2007 at the International Association for the Advancement of Space Safety 
(IAASS) meeting, with a draft document proposing an extension of ICAO's mandate to 
include space traffic management and safety up to and including geostationary orbit 
(Flightglobal, 2007).  Integrating air and space transportation systems, retitling the 
Chicago Convention as the Convention on International Civil Aerospace Transportation, 
and renaming the ICAO as the International Civil Aerospace Organization would provide 
needed support for the space tourism industry (Jakhu and Nyampong, 2010). 
 Existing space safety regulations are currently the domain of individual state 
agencies, such as FAA/AST and the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), 
established in 2002.  EASA is responsible for implementing air-related rules adopted by 
the European Commission, including airworthiness certification and compliance for 
suborbital airplanes, passenger safety and equipment, and ground facilities.  Cooperation 
with ESA, FAA and ICAO is considered essential to EASA‘s international success 
(Marciacq, 2010).  There are no international agreements, however, that require EASA or 
other state space tourism regulating agencies to consistently follow FAA/AST 
regulations.  The ―special contracts‖ clause of E.U.‘s Brussels I, Article 15 applies to 
E.U. citizens (Chatzipanagiotis, 2011), but how its application in the space tourism 
industry will affect civil judgments and forum selection is unknown.  
 Bilateral and multilateral agreements, manifestations of diplomatic optimism, are 
positive steps in achieving international goodwill, but governments can essentially 
modify the terms of those agreements after-the-fact by enacting new laws, creating 
ambiguity about the legality of previously instituted agreements.  The bilateral 1992 
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Russian Federation Agreement, for example, facilitated international cooperation 
between the U.S. and the Russian Federation.  The 1993 Russian Space Activity Law, 
which applies to both military and civilian space efforts, instituted RSA safety standards 
that differ from those of ESA and NASA (United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, 
1993), which could be interpreted as a legal attempt to ―change the rules.‖   
 As the number of states involved in space tourism activities increases, 
inconsistencies among bilateral and multilateral agreements, real and perceived 
differences in safety standards, and legal means for enforcement, have the potential to 
negatively impact the space tourism industry.  When passengers have no guarantees that 
safety standards are maintained, most passengers will be unwilling to take unnecessary 
risks.  International oversight is necessary to ensure that commercial space efforts will 
produce consistent legal regimes and safety standards to minimize risk, confusion, and 
disaster.  Space tourism is an industry already characterized by an absence of a safety 
record and as yet unrealized flight expectations.  Minimizing ambiguities and differences 
among international space tourism laws, procedures, and processes can best be achieved 
by an International Civil Aerospace Organization. 
Spaceports and Space Traffic 
 Space traffic management, as defined by the International Academy of 
Astronautics in its 2006 Cosmic Study on Space Traffic Management report, means  
the set of technical and regulatory provisions for promoting safe access 
into outer space, operations in outer space and return from outer space to 




In the U.S., the FAA/AST requires spaceport applicants to submit information on the 
proposed launch site operator, launch site location, foreign ownership interests, and 
launch site operations (Mineiro, 2010), spacecraft trajectory, and emergency plans 
(Federal Aviation Administration, June 15, 2005).  Spaceports, like airports, will be a mix 
of publicly coordinated functions and private enterprise corporations.  As of 2013, there 
were 17 U.S. spaceports either in the planning stage or under construction, under FAA or 
federal control, and four located in other states (Jakhu and Nyampong, 2010). 
 As commercial launch rates increase, as passengers, inflatable space habitats, and 
space hotels go into orbit, and as the launch rate and distribution of spaceports across the 
U.S. accelerates, the National Airspace System (NAS) will need to support, balance, and 
incorporate suborbital, and orbital spaceflight traffic into the Space and Air Traffic 
Management System (SATMS).  According to the FAA, this will require establishing 
reserved airspace near spaceports and incorporating the air traffic control (ATC) system 
to verify that space tourism vehicles remain within their designated airspace during 
descent and landing (Federal Aviation Administration, June 15, 2005).   
Commercial Spaceflight Federation 
  The Commercial Spaceflight Federation (CSF) is comprised of ―the leading 
businesses and organizations working to make commercial human spaceflight a reality‖ 
(Commercial Spaceflight Federation, 2014), including Alaska Aerospace Corporation, 
Blue Origin, Boeing, Cecil Field Spaceport, Masten Space Systems, Mojave Spaceport, 
Paragon SDC, Planetary Resources, Sierra Nevada Corporation, Southwest Research 
Institute, Space Adventures, Space Florida, Spaceport America, SpaceX, United Launch 
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Alliance, Virgin Galactic, and XCOR Aerospace (Commercial Spaceflight Federation, 
November 27, 2013).   
 Universities, educational and non-profit institutions can become Research and 
Education Affiliates.  Among these are Berkeley, Embry Riddle Aeronautical University, 
George Mason University, Iowa State University, Johns Hopkins, Princeton, Purdue, and 
the University of Central Florida (Commercial Spaceflight Federation, November 30, 
2013).  
 CFS‘ mission is 
to promote the development of commercial human spaceflight, pursue 
ever-higher levels of safety, and share best practices and expertise 
throughout the industry...which include commercial spaceflight 
developers, operators, spaceports, suppliers, and service providers, are 
creating thousands of high-tech jobs nationwide, working to preserve 
American leadership in aerospace through technology innovation, and 
inspiring young people to pursue careers in science and engineering 
(Commercial Spaceflight Federation, November 22, 2013). 
 
 CSF, more than any other commercial, state, or international space organization, 
has the expertise and leadership to make space tourism a reality.  The ICAO must work 
with CSF to establish appropriate regulatory structures and performance criteria for all 
phases of the space tourism industry because CSF organizations have the technical, 
development, manufacturing, and operating expertise (Crowther, 2011) that as Rutan 
noted, government regulators do not.   
Launching State and Licensing 
 International consensus to resolve technical, costly, and risky state and 
international issues arising from space tourism launches will need to be fair, transparent, 
logical, and balance the safety, economic, and technological aspects of launch operations 
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(von der Dunk, 2011).  The approach must enable the space industry to develop in the 
same way as the aviation industry did over the last century (von der Dunk, 2012).  Some 
states are taking the initiative to establish spacecraft licensing systems, which include 
regulations regarding reimbursement by private launch operators in the case of accidents 
and which require that licensees carry sufficient insurance.  In the U.S., space tourism 
licensing is handled by the FAA/AST per the 1984 Commercial Space Launch Act and its 
subsequent amendments.   
 The Chinese government is currently not focused on space tourism efforts and 
ITAR prevents Chinese citizens from participating in U.S. space tourism flights (Jin, 
2008).  Eventually, the Chinese government will create its own space tourism industry to 
provide its citizens and those from other banned states with space tourism opportunities, 
whether motivated by competitive political ideology or scientific exploration.  In 2001, 
Order No. 6 of the Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National 
Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People‘s Republic of China created 
the Measures for the Administration of Registration of Objects Launched into Outer 
Space (Measures for Registration).  Article 3 states:  ―These measures shall apply to all 
space objects launched in the territory of China, and the space objects jointly launched 
abroad by China and other States‖ (P.R.C. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2001). 
 The Chinese Commission of Science and Technology and Industry for National 
Defense (COSTIND) is responsible for space object registration.  Measures for 
Registration requires that the Department of International Cooperation and the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs also be consulted (P.R.C. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2001) under 
circumstances that are not clearly defined.  Article 14 states: 
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For international registration of a space object jointly launched by China 
and other States, the State of Registry shall be determined by the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs after consultation with concerned States in accordance 
with the Registration Convention (P.R.C. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
2001). 
 
The Registration Convention, however, requires that where there are two or more 
launching states involved in a launch, they shall jointly determine which one will register 
the object (United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, 1974).  This is only one 
example of a discrepancy between the application of international law and state practice.   
 The Chicago Convention and its associated SARPs provided the licensing 
structure and, as noted, communication protocols to encourage international expansion of 
the aviation industry.  SARPs for space tourism will be necessary to ensure international 
launch and licensing procedures to maintain communication, safety, and risk standards as 
space tourism demands increase and as new states enter the space tourism market.  
Liability and Insurance  
Despite an excellent and continually improving safety record there are 
certain risks inherent in space travel and an extremely high cost of pay 
load.  Because of this it is necessary for the Space Carrier to advise you 
that it cannot be responsible for the return of your body to Earth should 
you become deceased on the Moon or en route to the Moon.  However, it 
wishes to advise you that insurance covering this contingency is available 
in the Main Lounge. 
Thank you.     
 
Arthur C. Clarke and Stanley Kubrick 
A Space Odyssey Screenplay, 1968 
  
 Title 14, Chapter 2, Subchapter A, Part 205, Aircraft Accident Liability Insurance   
requires that  
(a) A U.S. or foreign direct air carrier shall not engage in air 
transportation unless it has in effect aircraft accident liability insurance 
coverage that meets the requirements of this part for its air carrier or 
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foreign air carrier operations (Legal Information Institute, November 
28, 2013). 
 
Consequently, there is already a well-established air and space insurance industry, with 
approximately 30 insurance providers currently offering coverage for launch and in-orbit 
operations of government and commercial satellites.  Most of the providers are large 
insurance companies, which could manage their exposure to the space industry (Freeland, 
2010).   
 Third party liability insurance under air law covers claims of third parties on the 
grounds of death, personal injury, or property damage.  There is no current international 
space law framework for third party liability.  FAA regulations for space tourism vehicles 
launching from the U.S. are the most comprehensive, and require that the operator obtain 
liability insurance or demonstrate financial responsibility for the maximum probable loss 
from claims by a third party and to the U.S. government, for damage to, or loss of, 
government property.  The maximum insurance coverage required for third party liability 
is $500 million; above that amount, up to $1.5 billion in third party claims will be paid by 
the federal government, but for amounts in excess of $1.5 billion, the operator is liable 
(van Oijhuizen Galhego Rosa, 2012).   
 Lack of international agreement on liability limits and insurance requirements 
complicates international space tourism operations.  ICAO, FAA/AST, EASA, and 
private space tourism operators will need to create an international legal insurance 
framework that balances the interests of the state, its citizens, space tourists, and private 
operators (von der Dunk, 2012).  This can be accomplished by establishing a ―Warsaw 
Convention for Space Tourism‖ modeled on the 1929 Warsaw Convention and its 
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subsequent amendments, including the 1952 Rome I, which specifically addressed air 
carrier liability for those injured on the ground as a result of air transportation mishaps 
(United Nations International Civil Aviation Organization, 1952), the 1995 Intercarrier 
Agreement on Passenger Liability, which because of its simplicity, could be adapted to 
reflect the changing state of the air tourism industry.  
Lessons from Antarctica: Preserving and Protecting the Space Environment 
 Antarctic tourism regulations attempt to balance scientific research, economic 
resource exploitation, and tourism activities to maintain the delicate Antarctic 
environment.  Like Antarctica, space will be utilized for each of these, the extent of 
which has not yet been fully explored (Peterson, 1997).  Without regulations similar to 
those of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, 1988 Mineral Resources Convention, 1991 
Environmental Protection Protocol, 1998 Declaration on Antarctic Tourism, the space 
environment may be subjected to its equivalent of Exxon Valdez-like disasters, or worse, 
as access to space goes beyond a small group of wealthy tourists.  The need to protect and 
preserve space artifacts and biological material will necessarily follow as hotels, waste 
and storage facilities, and transportation routes have the potential to damage footprints, 
rover tracks, and equipment. 
 Our limited knowledge about planetary environments is expanding.  The Spirit, 
Opportunity, and Curiosity rovers have not yet found signs of Martian flora or fauna, so 
establishing levels of protection for extraterrestrial life of any kind will depend on the 
nature of that life and the environment in which it is located.  If identified, it is likely to 
be found in an environment similar to that of Antarctica. 
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A New Space Treaty System 
 Current space treaties are separate and distinct; the ATS framework incorporates 
an array of unified Antarctic treaties that build upon each other and address 
environmental management, such as the designation of special management areas or 
protected zones, the development of a comprehensive environmental protection protocol, 
and the establishment of codes of conduct for terrestrial tourists, can be similarly created 
for celestial environments, space operators, and space tourists (Ehrenfreund, 2012).  
There is a vast array of outer space environments, from the terrestrial Martian surface and 
ice-covered Jovian moons, where life could exist, to the Moon and low-gravity asteroids, 
where life will not exist.  Both types of environments require protection to prevent 
accidental contamination, exploitation and destruction.   
International Association of Space Tourism Operators 
 An IAATO for the Moon and other celestial bodies, an International Association 
of Space Tour Operators (IASTO) could advocate for responsible travel into space, 
define acceptable space tourist activities, and protect previous landing sites and space-
related property.  Under traditional property law, property is considered abandoned when 
it is vacated with the intention of not returning.  Future lunar tourism operators might 
claim that the U.S. abandoned Apollo property because the U.S. has no concrete plans to 
retrieve Apollo artifacts, and if the courts were to agree, the U.S. would have relinquished 
its ownership claims to lunar artifacts, however, current space law contains no legal 
mechanisms for declaring space property as abandoned, subject to salvage, or removable 
without the owner‘s permission (Kleiman, 2011).  The U.S., however, has taken no action 
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to indicate that it has abandoned lunar artifacts, and an IASTO could take a leadership 
position in preserving and protecting U.S. and Russian landing sites. 
This is an important point because it implies that the U.N. will defer to the ATCPs to 
self-regulate legal disputes. 
International Declaration on Space Tourism 
 There is a substantial volume of artifacts left on the lunar surface from U.S., 
Soviet, and Japanese manned and unmanned missions.  On January 29, 2010, the 
California State Historical Resources Commission voted unanimously to designate more 
than 100 items at the Apollo 11 lunar landing site as protected resources.  This innovative 
action was based on the participation of and in support of the companies and employees 
of California corporations that had worked on the Apollo missions, and that many of the 
historically significant items that they produced remain on the lunar surface (McKinley, 
2010).  But it is not internationally binding. 
 Preservation of probes, rovers, lunar modules, experimental equipment, cameras, 
jettisoned objects at six lunar landing sites, astronaut footprints, and personal items, such 
as Alan Shepard‘s Apollo 14 golf balls and Charlie Duke‘s Apollo 16 family photo, are 
invaluable and irreplaceable traces of human exploration, and belong to all mankind 
(Spennemann, 2007).  They are an integral part of human history, of a vast technological, 
political, economic and social enterprise that directly and indirectly touched the lives of 
millions of humans and which will be forever part of the human experience.  Space 
tourism operators need to ensure that their passengers are able to access these objects 
only through a camera lens.   
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 As we venture into space appropriate tourism activities need to be defined.  
Masson-Zwaan and Freeland (2010) asked several interesting questions related to our 
future use of outer space and celestial bodies: 
Would it be acceptable, for example, to allow advertising billboards to be 
constructed, or casinos or even brothels to be established on the moon to 
cater to space tourists?  How do space tourism activities correlate with the 
underlying philosophy of international space law, namely that the 
exploration and use of outerspace shall be carried out for the benefit and in 
the interests of all countries and that they shall be the province of all 
mankind? 
 
These questions are similar to those that were addressed by the Declaration on Antarctic 
Tourism in 1998.  Should parts of space be permanently preserved from tourist activities?  
Should certain activities be banned?  Should structural facilities, such as hotels, visitor 
centers, and platforms, be restricted?  No sound argument can be made for allowing space 
tourists or space tourism operators to behave without restraint; failing to do so would 
have unforeseen and potentially irreparable consequences which could ruin the space 
environment, render it useless for activities of any kind, and  permanently destroy life or 
the potential for life on celestial bodies. 
Lessons from the International Space Station 
 Regulations on short suborbital or orbital flights will differ from those on longer 
duration flights, to the Moon and beyond.  Short flights will not require space tourists to 
demonstrate technical expertise, since they will be restricted to their seats like airline 
passengers, who obviously require no special training.  Longer flights, however, will 
likely mandate that space tourists posses skills and behaviors to protect the physical and 
mental well-being of other passengers, demonstrate proper use life support and 
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communication systems in case of emergencies, and take steps to preserve the spacecraft 
and outer space environment. 
Space Tourist Code of Conduct 
 The ISS Code of Conduct would serve well as the basis for a future Space Tourist 
Code of Conduct (STCC) and could be modified to include language specifically relevant 
to space tourist training, certification, in-flight activities, and interaction with other tourist 
participants as well as control, launch, and flight crews.  All space tourists will need to be 
held accountable during preflight training activities and should be subject to removal 
from flight consideration if they fail to abide by an STCC.   
Safety Standards and Human Factors Considerations 
Safety First.  Basic emergency response training, prescribed by our 
regulators will be at the forefront.  Activities to familiarize you with the 
spaceflight environment will follow a close second. 
 
Virgin Galactic 
The Dream, 2013 
 
 Every space tourism vehicle must be sufficiently robust to endure meteor impacts, 
radiation, and other known space environment dangers.  The spacecraft should also be 
stocked with emergency supplies and a reliable life support system.  This leads to the 
necessity for a ―lifeboat,‖ an attached vehicle, or one on Earth, which can be quickly 
deployed to initiate a space rescue.  ISS practice requires a vehicle be attached to the 
habitat in the event that the station needs to be evacuated.   Space operators could keep a 
small fleet of space tourism vehicles operating simultaneously to initiate rescues 
(Beamer-Downie, 2012).   
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 In 2008, Congress mandated that spacefaring nations engage in discussions that 
would ensure common docking systems on all space vehicles.  For the ISS, as an 
international endeavor, this was a necessity; for the space tourism industry, it should also 
be a requirement, since common systems greatly increase the possibility of successful 
rescue missions (Beamer-Downie, 2012).  While this may prove to be initially expensive, 
cooperation among space tourism operators will inform space tourists that safety is an 
industry priority, and will encourage their participation in space-related tourism activities. 
Crew Training 
 The greatest challenge in the early days of space tourism will be ensuring the 
space participant safety, which will require proper crew training.  In the event of an 
emergency, the crew‘s skill at saving passengers could determine their fate as well as that 
of the space tourism company (Sundahl, 2009).  Space tourism operators will need to 
establish crew resource management practices and safety systems to mitigate risk.  Rules, 
regulations and standard practices must be the result of collaborative efforts between the 
private sector and regulators (Beamer-Downie, 2012).  Many of those have been 
articulated in the 2005 Draft Guidelines for Crewed Commercial Suborbital RLV 
Operations and Draft Guidelines for Passengered Commercial RLV Operations.  
Passenger Training 
 Of all of the aspects of space tourism, those concerning passengers are the most 
unpredictable.  Space tourists are not astronauts in the conventional sense.  They receive 
minimal training, do not need to meet the same strenuous medical standards as astronauts 
or cosmonauts, have not been studied as a group or as individuals to assess their physical 
or psychological reactions to stressful situations, and have not engaged in a wide variety 
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of scientific, medical, technological, and social experiments as those who have been in 
space repeatedly or for long time periods. 
 Peeters (2010) characterized space tourism as: ―a once-in-a-lifetime experience 
that will attract people who are not risk averse…tourists want to be a part of the astronaut 
experience and are willing to undergo (limited) training.‖  To meet that expectation, 
commercial entities have designed training opportunities for space flight participants.  
Atlas Aerospace offers General Space Training (GST), Specialized Space Training 
(SST), and Preflight Space Training (PST).  Atlas markets the program to cosmonauts, 
astronauts, and pilots, but also to 
space tourists who get ready to participate in short-time manned missions 
on Russian space ships ‗Soyuz‘, and on other prospective space crafts built 
for implementation of space orbital or suborbital flights‖ (Atlas 
Aerospace, 2013).  
 
 Black Sky Training also offers training for space flight participants, but that 
training is obviously not as rigorous as those required of pilots or crew members: 
The FAA also realizes the value of training and requires that each space 
flight participant, before flight, be trained in ―how to respond to 
emergency situations, including smoke, fire, loss of cabin pressure, and 
emergency exit.‖  Each spaceflight participant will undergo training to 
prepare them for the flight.  The lessons will be tailored for the vendor 
they will fly with and the spacecraft they will ride.  These lessons include 
emergency situations, G tolerance, high altitude and pressure suit training. 
Mock ups of the spacecraft they will ride will be used in emergency 
simulation drills as well as orientation rides in the BST rocket trainer 
(Black Sky Training, 2013). 
 
Training that meets FAA requirements would likely take several weeks.  Virgin Galactic, 
however, plans on only three days of pre-flight preparation for sub-orbital travel which 
raises questions about the effectiveness of that training especially in emergency situations 
(Reddy et al., 2012).   
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 No matter how they are defined, astronaut or space tourist, the risks of voyaging 
into space will remain.  Space is a dangerous environment, but risks can be mitigated 
through the application of safety standards and appropriate training to provide space 
participants with unique and profound experiences. 
Medical Requirements  
 The most likely illness encountered by space tourists during flights longer than 
two hours will be space motion sickness (SMS), characterized by nausea, headache, 
dizziness.  Two-thirds of all astronauts experience SMS during the first hours in space, it 
is difficult to predict and cannot necessarily be induced by ground-based or parabolic 
flight training (ISU Summer Session Students, 2000).   
 Other medical problems were experienced by astronauts and cosmonauts in the 
last 50 years, but because they undergo lengthy training, some of those problems can be 
identified or mitigated before they enter space.  This will not be the case with space 
tourists, whose symptoms may not appear until they are actually in space, under low 
gravity.  During short orbital and suborbital missions, some of which will be shorter than 
normal airplane flights, these conditions will likely not be serious.  For very short 
duration sub-orbital flights, only guidelines similar to those for variable gravity rides, like 
roller coasters may be necessary. 
 For orbital, lunar, or long-term flights, hypertension, heart disease, psychiatric 
illness and pregnancy would exclude prospective passengers from traveling into space.   
Cardiovascular, hematological, and musculoskeletal may manifest themselves during the 
flight or even after they return to Earth (Stewart et al., 2007).  Kluge et al. (2012) 
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suggested that a medical questionnaire, flight surgeon screening, training, reevaluation, 
and preflight checkout could prevent sending unfit passengers into space. 
 All space tourists, with few exceptions, would need to be physically able to enter 
and exit the spacecraft.  Passengers denied tickets on this basis, or those not meeting 
some physical or psychological standard for space flight, might sue under the Americans 
with Disabilities Act.  If disabled passengers are allowed to fly in space, whether or not 
they would be able to bring helper animals raises another issue, as do minimum and 
maximum minimum passenger ages (Scott, 2000).  Virgin Galactic founder Richard 
Branson has also publicly stated that his 91-year-old father plans to fly with him on the 
first commercial SpaceShipTwo flight (Futron Corporation, 2006). 
 In the event of a medical emergency, a carrier could be sued for failing to have 
resources and equipment available to save a passenger.  FAA/AST flight crew guidelines 
require all members of a space tourism flight crew to be to operate the vehicle in the 
event of an emergency, but do not list recommendations for emergency medical training.  
In the absence of legal regulations covering space tourism, space tourism operators 
should provide reasonable medical support by including first aid equipment and 
communication channels with medical experts on Earth (Marsh, 2006). 
 The ISS serves as a good example for commercial space operators.  Two members 
of each ISS crew are trained crew medical officers (CMO), responsible for station 
medical treatment.  ISS crew have an advanced life support pack, medical restraints, a 
protection kit in the event of toxic contamination, an ultrasound, a defibrillator, and an 
emergency respiratory support pack for stabilization prior to emergency transportation 
back to Earth.  CMOs have the support of an entire medical team of physicians, 
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biomedical engineers, information technology specialists, nurses, and a flight surgeon, 
via radio and video communications (Marsh, 2006). 
 Space tourism companies would be well advised to carry basic medical equipment 
on suborbital, orbital, and long duration flights, and additional equipment for longer 
flights, and should adapt some of the processes and procedures currently used by NASA, 
RSA, and their partners, carefully developed over the last four decades during ISS 
missions.  At a minimum, these should include on-call physicians for telemedical 
consultations, surgical facilities, sterilization and transfusion equipment, an automatic 
external cardiac defibrillator (Stewart et al., 2007) and appropriate pharmaceuticals for 
space sickness and heart conditions (Marsh, 2006).  
A Global Code for Space Tourism 
The most challenging problems of the planet are global— the environment 
and global warming and climate change, ocean management, poverty and 
diseases, food and energy, near earth objects and planet protection, war on 
terror, are examples.  These problems, however, are shared and cannot be 
solved by any one nation alone.  Space is a global common and shared 
resource, and space technology potentially a valuable tool for the 
mitigation of these problems.  Yet, when collaborative space initiatives are 
suggested as solutions, policy and governance serve as barriers.  
 
 Joseph Fuller, Jr., David Vaccaro and  
 Dustin Kaiser  
 Space Policy and Governance as Barriers to 
International Collaboration, 2010 
 
 In 2001, the United Nations World Tourism Organization (UNWTO) adopted the 
Global Code of Ethics for Tourism (Tourism Code).  Article 4(1) states ‖Tourism 
resources belong to the common heritage of mankind; the communities in whose 
territories they are situated have particular rights and obligations to them…‖ (United 
Nations World Tourism Organization, 2001).  The ―common heritage of mankind‖ 
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principle is a recurring theme in many of the laws, treaties, and codes that reference 
human behavior.  A modified version of this code may serve as a potential model for a 
future space tourism code.  
 The majority of the laws, regulations, codes and declarations that control 
commercial space tourism operators and their passengers have been created by political 
entities, state and international governments, and the U.N., through agreements arrived at 
through the deliberations of government representatives.  While these may suffice for 
now, in the future many will be ineffective and unenforceable.  Behavioral norms, 
enacted by states in a non-global society, are unsustainable in a modern, globalized 
world, characterized by 
 boundaries that transcend territorial limits, formed by invisible colleges, 
invisible markets and branches, invisible professional communities, invisible 
social networks that call for the emergence of new laws; 
 legislative bodies of diminishing importance; global law is produced in self-
organized processes of structural coupling of law with ongoing globalized 
processes of a highly specialized and technical nature; 
 independence; legal processes in some states have become insulated and may be 
enforced in the foreseeable future, but global laws will work to reduce their 
weaknesses; and 
 legal evolution that relies upon a variety of legal sources (Teubner, 1997). 
 
 In the world of the future space tourist, a new set of laws which are the result of a 
―plurality of competing laws‖ (Robé, 1997) will need to be established for space, which 
extends far beyond the global arena.  As Teubner (1997) suggested  
The new living law of the world is nourished not from stores of tradition 
but from the ongoing self-reproduction of highly technical, highly 
specialized, often formally organized and rather narrowly defined, global 
networks of an economic, cultural, academic or technological nature. 
 
 In a space society, where existing legislative bodies not only lack the technical 
expertise to regulate the space tourism industry and enact damaging laws, like the Arms 
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Export Control Act and the ITAR, state regulations will be replaced by codes created by 
future space tourists and the commercial entities that get them into space.  Over time, the 
space tourism industry will create its own Global Code of Ethics for Space Tourism.  
While this new Space Code could be modeled, in part, after the 2001 U.N. WTO Global 
Code of Ethics for Tourism, it will need to go beyond the  
decisive and central role of this Organization, as recognized by the 
General Assembly of the United Nations, in promoting and developing 
tourism with a view to contributing to economic development, 
international understanding, peace, prosperity, and universal respect for, 
and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms…(United 
Nations World Tourism Organization, 2001) 
 
and attend to  
 
responsible and sustainable tourism is by no means incompatible with the 
growing liberalization of the conditions governing trade in services and 
under whose aegis the enterprises of this sector operate and that it is 
possible to reconcile in this sector economy and ecology, environment and 
development…(United Nations World Tourism Organization, 2001). 
 
The Space Code should adhere to many of the same principles as the Tourism Code, in 
―the understanding and promotion of the ethical values common to humanity,‖ the 
promotion of safety and security, the protection of cultural and natural heritage, and 
―mutual tolerance and for learning‖ (United Nations World Tourism Organization, 2001). 
 Article 7(1) of the Tourism Code provides that  
The prospect of direct and personal access to the discovery and enjoyment 
of the planet‘s resources constitutes a right equally open to all the world‘s 
inhabitants, the increasingly extensive participation in national and 
international tourism should be regarded as one of the best possible 
expressions of the sustained growth of free time, and obstacles should not 
be placed in its way (United Nations World Tourism Organization, 2001). 
 
Article 7(1) of the Future Space Code may instead say 
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The prospect of direct access to discover and view the Earth from above, 
whether from suborbital or orbital flight, or on the way to a lunar 
adventure, constitutes a right equally open to all the world‘s inhabitants, 
the increasingly extensive participation in space tourism should be 
regarded as one of the best possible expressions of the sustained growth of 
free time, and obstacles should not be placed in its way. 
 
 As a global society, we are about to go en masse, ―where no one has gone before‖ 
(Duane and Reaves, 1987).  While the last half century has provided legal guidelines, 
court cases, treaties, declarations, codes, warnings, and lessons, the space tourism 
industry will go figuratively and literally far beyond 20
th
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